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agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another

Z
party is traditionallyper se illegal under the antitrustlaws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers,
and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsoredcourts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactionsand induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to
deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs
institutionaleconomics to understandthe role of coordinatedrefusals to
deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of
permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes
that if the objective of antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency,
then per se treatment-orany heightened presumption of illegality-of
reputation mechanisms with coordinatedpunishments is misplaced.

"[I]n business a reputation for keeping absolutely to the letter and spirit of an agreement, even when it is unfavourable,
is the most precious of assets, although it is not entered in
the balance sheet."
Lord Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton)'
INTRODUCTION

Though certainly not the first to remark on the value of a good
reputation,2 Oliver Lyttelton nicely observed how reputations are

'Oliver Lyttelton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos: An Unexpected View From the Summit 335 (1963).
2 See, e.g., D. Lyman, Jr., The Moral Sayings of Publius Syrus, A Roman Slave:
From the Latin 20 (1862) ("A good reputation is more valuable than money."). Given
the combination of economic and noneconomic sanctions discussed infra, and given
the devastating completeness of these sanctions, perhaps Casio put it best after
Othello dismissed him for contributing to a drunken brawl: "Reputation, reputation, I
ha' lost my reputation! I ha' lost the immortal part, sir, of myself, and what remains is
bestial...." William Shakespeare, Othello, act 2, scene 3 11.254-56 (M.R. Ridley ed.,
1962).

2009]

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms

often called upon to fill the gaps in agreements that are beyond the
reach-and even some within the reach-of courts. Prior scholarship has also observed that reputations can serve to monitor product quality,3 reduce litigation costs,' and, the focus of this Article,
support executory contracts In each of these instances, institutions
provide reputation mechanisms to enforce pledges that are either
unenforceable or too costly to enforce in court.
Could it be, then, that reputation mechanisms amount to an antitrust violation? This Article says, yes, they could, but generally,
they should not. They could because (among other reasons) reputation mechanisms foreclose commerce to targeted individuals and
can amount to a group boycott, which the Supreme Court as recently as 1998 reiterated is a per se violation of U.S. antitrust law.6
They should not, however, because many reputation mechanisms
arise to govern desirable economic activity, and they do so more
efficiently-that is, with fewer transaction costs-than public
courts, firms, and other enforcement instruments that antitrust
does not scrutinize. To the degree that reputation mechanisms
provide net benefits, and to the degree that antitrust law strives to
promote economic welfare,7 reputation mechanisms identify useful
'See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615, 615-17 (1981).
'See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 510-12
(1994).
'See Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 L. & Soc. Inquiry 383 (2006); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 115-17 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamonds]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1745-62
(2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton].
'See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1998) ("The Court has
found the per se rule applicable in certain group boycott cases ... involving horizontal
agreements among direct competitors."); see also cases cited infra note 37. See discussion infra Part II for other ways in which reputation mechanisms may conflict with
U.S. antitrust law.
'See Reiner v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 91 (1978)
("The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative
efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no
gain or a net loss in consumer welfare."). There is a debate in antitrust law over
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and necessary reforms to current antitrust law.8 They also present
an opportunity for institutional economics to inform antitrust law,
such that the efficiency of an arrangement is evaluated not just by
prices and output but also in light of transactional realities and institutional contexts.9
whether the objective is to maximize consumer welfare or total welfare. Compare
FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc. 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1991) (advocating a consumer welfare standard), and United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064,
1084-85 (D. Del. 1991) (same), with Bork, supra, at 90 ("Consumer welfare.., is
merely another term for the wealth of the nation. Antitrust thus ... has nothing to say
about the ways prosperity is distributed or used."), and Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 105,
105, 108-09 (1969) ("[A flexible] version of the allocative efficiency criterion [should]
become the principal basis for formulating antitrust policy and enforcing the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.... [A]ntitrust might best be enforced by suppressing redistributional considerations. Moreover, where systematic exploitation exists, the indicated
remedy is to provide a legislative exception rather than a judicial correction. To involve the courts in such merit choices is inadvisable: 'There can be few more intensely
political determinations and few for which the judicial process is less suited."') (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775, 839 (1965)).
For a survey and assessment of economic arguments in favor of applying a consumer welfare standard in antitrust analysis, see Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz,
The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 Competition Pol'y Int'l 3 (2006).
'Loosening the antitrust laws in this fashion, and narrowing the application of the
per se rule, is consistent with recent Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., Leegin Creative
Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007) ("The Court has abandoned
the rule of per se illegality for other vertical restraints a manufacturer imposes on its
distributors.... We now hold ... that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the
rule of reason."). It also is consistent with Frank Easterbrook's prescient remark
more than two decades ago: "As time goes by, fewer and fewer things seem appropriate for per se condemnation." Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 10 (1984).
'Jonathan Adler makes a related point in observing that cooperatives of fishermen
employed output-increasing concerted refusals to deal to limit harvesting and conserve fish stocks. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as
an Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3 (2004).
Adler criticizes the local court for finding the fishermen's group boycott to be per se
illegal and refusing to recognize the boycott's arguably procompetitive purpose and
effect. Id. at 4-7 (discussing Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., 41 F. Supp. 531
(N.D. Cal. 1941)). Adler admirably "explores the tension between antitrust principles
and conservation of the marine commons," id. at 8, but does not offer a theory to
evaluate the efficiency of group boycotts. This Article provides an institutional economic framework that is readily applied to the Manaka decision.
Gary Libecap similarly documents a collection of different collaborations among
competitors designed to secure property rights for procompetitive ends, including a
price fixing arrangement by shrimp and oyster fishermen. Gary Libecap, Contracting
for Property Rights 88 (1993) (discussing The Gulf Coast Shrimpers' and Oystermen's
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Since much of antitrust analysis rests on fact-intensive determinations, this Article examines the intersection of antitrust and
reputation mechanisms by focusing on a specific case study: the use
of reputations among New York's diamond merchants. The diamond industry may constitute a paradigmatic illustration of reputation mechanisms and associated group boycotts, since the industry
enforces its contracts by relying almost exclusively-without any
court involvement-on reputations and coordinated punishment.
Though few industries are comparable, it has been noted that "the
study of extreme instances often helps to illuminate the essentials
of a situation.""0 Examining the diamond industry is fruitful not because it is a representative industry, but because it crisply reveals
the underlying tension between private ordering and competition
law like few illustrations can.
Part I provides the factual background. It details how the diamond industry implements a coordinated reputation mechanism to
enforce executory contracts and sustain reliable transactions without relying on state-sponsored courts. Part II then presents the potential legal challenges, illustrating the variety of ways in which the
diamond industry's use of reputations might violate U.S. antitrust
law. It observes that the industry's group boycotts rely on horizontal agreements among competitors that normally warrant antitrust
scrutiny. Part III contains the justification for reforming antitrust
law. It employs transaction cost economics to illustrate that reputation mechanisms and their corresponding group boycotts can be institutionally efficient mechanisms to enforce diamond transactions.
The diamond industry's reputation mechanism is a horizontal restraint designed to compensate for the deficiencies of state courts,
and thus it should be construed under antitrust law as a procompetitive joint venture rather than a per se (or any other kind of)
violation of the Sherman Act. This comparative institutional analysis reveals that while reputation mechanisms do pose hazards, and
Association v. United States, 236 F.2d 658 (1956)). Unlike the normative efficiency
analysis offered in this Article, Libecap's extremely valuable book offers a positive
model of institutional change, focusing on "the actual process by which property institutions are changed and whether the changes represent an efficient solution to a particular social problem...." Id. at 2.
" Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
Relational Contracting 35 (1985) (citing Behavioral Sciences Subpanel, President's
Science Advisory Committee, Strengthening the Behavioral Sciences 5 (1962)).
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thus appropriately encounter scrutiny from antitrust law, transaction cost economics can guide an antitrust rule of reason analysis
that indicates when reputation mechanisms should be permissible.
Part IV then discusses some notable cases involving key figures in
the U.S. diamond industry and its trade association, the New York
Diamond Dealers' Club. These cases illustrate certain costs of private ordering: the temptation to pursue noneconomic gains, to
punish efficient entrants, and to secure rents for industry leaders at
the expense of outsiders. Since a rule of reason analysis must weigh
the costs of collective self-enforcement against its institutional efficiencies, these cases help demonstrate how to distinguish procompetitive applications of reputation mechanisms from anticompetitive group boycotts.
I. THE SETTING: PRIVATE ORDERING OF DIAMOND
TRANSACTIONS 1

The most significant feature of diamond transactions is the unreliability of state courts in enforcing executory contracts. The typical
diamond transaction is a credit sale or a brokerage arrangementsituations in which a diamond or cache of diamonds is in the possession of someone who is not the owner.12 Because diamonds are
easily portable, virtually untraceable, and command high prices
throughout the world, a potential thief encounters few obstacles in
hiding unpaid-for or stolen diamonds from law enforcement officials, fleeing American jurisdiction, and selling the valuable diamonds to black market buyers. Accordingly, state courts can neither discipline parties nor seize stolen assets that escape their
jurisdictional reach. Even sophisticated legal instruments, such as
liens or other devices to secure assets as collateral, cannot reliably
prevent diamond theft, which in the language of contract law is the
failure to pay for a sale on credit." These important limitations on
"Much of this Part is adapted from Richman, supra note 5.
12 See id. at 390-92 (explaining the heightened importance of credit, credit sales, and
brokers in the diamond industry).
" Diamonds remain the choice currency of fleeing fugitives. For example, Martin
Frankel, the troubled fugitive financier whose collapsed financial schemes prompted
federal prosecution, arranged a shadowy purchase of over ten million dollars in diamonds before his attempted escape from U.S. authorities. Ellen Joan Pollack, The
Pretender 205 (2002). Diamond theft also continues to be a severe problem for the
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the capabilities of state courts force the diamond industry to depend instead on private mechanisms to enforce contracts. Hence,
the industry relies primarily on an elaborate reputation mechanism.
The underlying mechanics of reputation mechanisms are well
understood. Individuals make decisions to enter into relationships
with others based on the past actions of their potential partners. In
the commercial context, merchants will refuse to enter into contracts with, or will demand a risk premium from, individuals who
have failed to fulfill their previous contractual obligations. In a cooperation-sustaining equilibrium, the prospect of losing future
business opportunities (or paying future premiums) is sufficient to
deter bad behavior, so the reputation mechanism-and the credible threat of coordinated punishment of individuals who earn bad
reputations-is sufficient to induce contractual compliance and
support reliable exchange.
However well-understood the theory is, the practicalities of implementing a reputation mechanism are daunting. The central challenges include (1) facilitating the prompt dissemination of accurate
information so each merchant's history is known to potential exchange partners and (2) imposing a credible and sufficiently painful
punishment to deter misconduct. The diamond industry's rules and
structure enable a reputation mechanism that meets these challenges, induces contractual compliance, and thus supports transactional reliability where courts cannot.
A. The Industry's Rules
The diamond industry's central nervous system-the mechanisms that enable the industry's use of reputations and support exchange-lies in its network of diamond bourses scattered throughout the world's diamond centers. New York's bourse, the New

industry despite technological advances in security. In 2003, rough and polished diamonds worth approximately C100,000,000 were stolen from Antwerp vaults. Chris
Summers, Hopes of Finding Diamond Haul Fade, BBC News Online, Feb. 14, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3364911.stm. In 2004, a diamond heist in London
included earrings that had belonged to Marie Antoinette. Sarah White, Yard Hunts
Queen's im Diamonds; Marie Antoinette's Gems Stolen in Raid, The Express
(London), Aug. 14, 2004, at 26. For a list of such thefts, see http://www.diamonds.net/
news/Default.aspx?Search=theft (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
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York Diamond Dealers' Club (DDC), located in Manhattan's diamond district on 47th Street, is organized like the others as a voluntary association with by-laws and mandatory rules for its diamond
merchant members. The DDC's approximately 1800 members organize the vast majority of America's commercial traffic in diamonds, with most members acting as middlemen between the diamond producers who mine the stones (most of which are organized
by the DeBeers syndicate) and the diamond retailers who convert
them into jewelry. Nearly half of the world's sixty-billion-dollar
sales in diamond jewelry are in the United States, 4 and DDC
members handle over ninety-five percent of the diamonds imported into the country. 5 Since most diamonds are bought and sold
several times before they are ultimately purchased by a jewelry
manufacturer, DDC merchants are active traders and transact with
each other frequently.
As a voluntary association, the DDC has extensive rules and bylaws to which each member must agree upon his admission. Failure
to comply with DDC rules would lead to a member's dismissal.
The DDC rules govern much of the members' commercial activity,
including the mechanics of executing diamond sales between DDC
merchants. For example, the DDC By-Laws assert that all oral
agreements are binding when certain words are used to express accord, that written offers made through brokers are open until 1:00
p.m. the following day, and that DDC-provided scales will determine the official weight of transacted diamonds. 6 The DDC ByLaws also establish rules for transactions with out-of-town dealers,
the requirements for maintaining membership in good-standing,
and the rigorous process of admitting new members. 7
The most important of the DDC By-Laws provides for an arbitration panel.'8 Arbitrators are fellow DDC members who have
" See Jason Feifer, Diamonds Shine On: Life Doesn't Stop for a Bad Economy,
Worcester Telegram & Gazette, Apr. 1, 2004, at El (providing international figures);
Susan Thea Posnock, Journey Helps Diamond Jewelry Rise 6.1 Percent in '06, Nat'l
Jeweler, May 1, 2007, at 12 (providing U.S. figures).
" See Thomas J. Lueck, Diamond District Tries to Dispel Its Private Bazaar Image,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1997, at B12.
16See Diamond Dealers Club By-Laws art. XVIII (1999) [hereinafter
DDC ByLaws] ("Trade Rules").
"See id. arts. III ("Members"), XVII ("Out-Of-Town Dealers").
See id. art. XII ("Arbitration").
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earned the respect of their peers and have abundant industry expertise. The panel abides by its own set of procedures that limit testimony (and thus a trial's length) and enable arbitrators to ask
questions and probe into fact-finding. These rules empower arbitration panels to arrive at prompt and informed rulings. 9 More significantly, the By-Laws provide that any dispute arising between
DDC merchants-whether a seller accuses a buyer of missing
payment or a buyer accuses a seller of failing to furnish the diamonds that were promised-may only be brought before the
DDC's Arbitration Panel. Members are prohibited from bypassing
DDC arbitration and bringing suit instead in New York state
courts or any other system of dispute resolution.
The arbitration panel is at the fountainhead of the industry's
reputation mechanism. Once a panel has reached a conclusion, it
announces nothing more than its judgment, which amounts to identifying the merchant against whom the panel issued a judgment, the
date the judgment was decided, and the amount owed. The individual found to be liable has an opportunity to pay his debt to the
merchant who brought the suit, and if he does so he remains a
DDC member in good standing. However, if that individual fails to
make payment immediately following the arbitration panel's decision, he is dismissed as a member of the DDC.20 In addition, a picture of the individual in default is placed on the wall of the DDC's
central trading hall with a caption that details his failure to comply
with the arbitration panel's ruling, which immediately makes the
default known to all DDC members.2 News of the individual's default spreads rapidly throughout the global marketplace as similar
"Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 135-38, 148-51 (describing at length the
many efficiency-enhancing features of the DDC's adjudication process).
0Parties who lose in arbitration have limited appeal rights, with DDC rulings final
and state courts largely deferential to the industry's private arbitration. See, e.g., In re
World Trade Diamond Corp., 550 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding
that DDC arbitration rulings should be upheld absent evidence of misconduct, bias,
or abuse of power). New York courts have overturned DDC arbitration rulings, however, where there is evidence of arbitrator bias or prejudicial conduct. See Goldfinger
v. Lisker, 500 N.E.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. 1986) (vacating a DDC arbitration award because the arbitrator engaged in improper private communication with one litigant);
Rabinowitz v. Olewski, 473 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (replacing DDC
arbitrator with an independent arbitrator when one party had cause to fear discriminatory treatment).
2 See DDC By-Laws, supra note 16, art. XII, § 25.
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pictures and captions are placed in the world's twenty-two other
diamond bourses as well. This formal dissemination of information
supplements the transmission of news through the many informal
information networks in the DDC and other bourses worldwide.
Each bourse, which houses restaurants, prayer halls, and other areas where members congregate regularly, is designed to gather
merchants together, thereby collecting and disseminating valuable
market and reputation information.22
Thus, the DDC's procedures-and the similar procedures of the
world's other diamond bourses-ensure that news of an individual's default spreads quickly to future potential trade partners.
This news substantially affects commercial opportunities. Merchants in default have tremendous difficulty obtaining further
business, and maintaining a DDC membership in good standing
becomes a signal to other merchants of a spotless past. Even
though former DDC members are prohibited from entering the
DDC trading halls, nothing legally precludes them from remaining
in the diamond business, and, more important, no law and nothing
in the DDC By-Laws precludes other diamond merchants from
dealing with individuals who were expelled from the DDC. The
DDC By-Laws require nothing more than the expulsion of a member in default and the posting of his picture and his arbitrationdetermined debt on the DDC's wall. Nonetheless, current DDC
members will not transact with merchants who were dismissed
from the DDC because their own reputations would be discredited
by dealing with members who have failed to live up to previous
commitments. In short, merchants dismissed from the DDC are
shut out of the lucrative diamond business.

22See

Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 121 ("The bourse is an information ex-

change as much as it is a commodities exchange."); Richman, supra note 5, at 397
("[T]he Club creates both a physical and a relational infrastructure that facilitates information sharing between members."). The bourses are also designed to facilitate
social gatherings among merchants, and even retired merchants continue to spend
their days in the bourse halls. Consequently, being scorned or ostracized from the
merchant community imposes both economic and non-economic harm. See infra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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B. How It Works
Rudimentary game theory suggests that the threat of coordinated punishment will deter misconduct only if the benefits of
long-term cooperation exceed the value of a one-time defection.
This tradeoff between long-term versus one-time payoffs is particularly stark for diamond merchants, since most diamond transactions offer a one-time defection opportunity-stealing a cache of
diamonds-with an enormous payoff. Thus, an equilibrium of longterm cooperation is realized only if long-term payoffs are both assured and appropriately rewarding.
The diamond industry's system of rewards and punishments,
which is responsible for securing credible contract enforcement,
rests on a remarkable network of family and community institutions.' Since diamond dealers will only deal with other dealers who
maintain a strong reputation, a merchant found by the DDC arbitrators to have defaulted on a contractual obligation will no longer
be able to do business with other industry actors. Moreover, merchants almost exclusively come from family businesses, where profitability is dependent on the quality of a family's reputation and
where family reputations are both inherited and bequeathed. Because a good reputation is essentially a prerequisite to enjoying
profitable dealings, entry is largely limited to merchants who enjoy
some reputational sponsorship and tacit insurance from existing
industry players. Thus, family connections create a valuable and
otherwise hard-to-obtain entryway into the industry. Conversely,
fulfilling contractual obligations and maintaining a good reputation
secures not only a lifetime of business but also enables one to confer a good reputation, and the opportunity to secure future business, on one's heirs.24 Merchants are thus induced to fulfill their
contractual obligations throughout their lifetimes, and the industry
overcomes what game theorists typically describe as an end-game
problem.
The diamond industry is also deeply connected with community
institutions that distribute non-economic benefits to diamond dealers, and these community benefits play a critical role in ensuring
cooperation. Merchants almost exclusively come out of tightly knit,
3See Richman, supra note 5, at 397-98.
id. at 403-04.

24See
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ethnically homogeneous communities (DDC members, for example, come predominantly from traditionally observant Jewish
communities) whose members enjoy partaking in the unique club
goods that the community offers. The community leaders and institutions that distribute these club goods contribute to the diamond
industry's reputation mechanism by doling out benefits to cooperating merchants and withholding them from those who defect.' For
New York's Jewish merchants, synagogues and other community
religious institutions bestow honors and allocate scarce and nonreplicable services to respected members while withholding them
from community members in lower repute.' Consequently, a merchant's business reputation shapes his reputation in, and the enjoyment he derives from, his religious community. These family
and community mechanisms secure long-term cooperation and enforce credit sales despite the enormous temptation to cheat a diamond seller.
This reliance on reputations, and on the associated sanctions
from both industry and community institutions, means that the
reach of the DDC arbitration board is limited to cooperating parties. Merchants comply with the DDC arbitration board not to
avoid the brunt of the DDC penalties, but instead to reap the benefits of having good industry and community reputations. Thus, the
DDC's actions will only compel compliance from those who have
strong preferences to remain active in the industry and respected in
their community. Accordingly, the role of the DDC's arbitration
board is purely informational, and the power of its dispute resolution system rests solely on the degree to which it can disseminate
information about merchant reputations and past dealings. In this
sense, the DDC is much like the private judges in the sixteenthcentury Champagne Fairs, whose power lay solely in their ability to
publicize the names of individuals who shirked contractual obliga' See id. at 406-09. These family and community institutions not only explain how
diamond merchants manage to sustain cooperation, but they also explain why the industry is dominated by ethnic networks. In short, these institutions provide merchants
from certain ethnically homogeneous and insular groups a comparative advantage
over other potential competitors.
Id. For a richly detailed window into how observant Jewish communities dispense
community services, and for a description of the differences across assorted Jewish
religious sects, such that one community's services are nonreplicable in others, see
Samuel Heilman, Defenders of the Faith (1992).
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tions." Perhaps the continued use of reputations in the diamond
industry into the modern era also illustrates important differences
between the Champagne Fairs and the diamond trade. Reputational sanctions in the Champagne Fairs were generically applied
to all merchants and were later displaced when more effective
state-sponsored enforcement became available, but the diamond
industry dispenses pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards that are
tailored to the fairly unique preferences and needs of the Jewish
diamond merchants. The diamond industry's very unusual structure and reward system remains necessary because of the very extreme risks associated with diamond credit sales and the lack of effective state-sponsored replacements.'
Since the DDC's primary role is disseminating the information
upon which the collective enforcement mechanisms rely, the reliability of reputation information, not just its dissemination, is also
crucial to ensure proper incentives to cooperate. Several forces
work to ensure the veracity of industry information sources. The
composition of the DDC's arbitration board provides one guarantee of accuracy. The industry's arbitrators are experienced insiders
who are extremely familiar with the nature of the industry and the
difficulties involved in entering diamond contracts. Their expertise
helps arbitrators understand the context within which disputes
arise, distinguish meritorious from nonmeritorious claims, assess
the reliability of proffered evidence, and, when appropriate, impose the proper damages. Additionally, the board may respond to
27Paul

R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institu-

tions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1, 1-4 (1990). The diamond bourses' role in disseminating information has historically been their foremost function, and their less established
predecessors were similarly designed to facilitate the flow of information about market participants and business opportunities. See Abe Michael Shainberg, Jews and the
Diamond Trade, in 1 The Jewish Directory and Almanac 301, 308 (1984) (tracing the
informational purpose and history of diamond clubs to 15th-century Belgium).
' The diamond industry also restricts participation to parties who have family or
community connections with industry players, so fewer unknown parties are entrusted
with credit. These entry restrictions-which go hand-in-hand with the natural limited
appeal of industry and community rewards-also helps explain the industry's durability. Systems of reputational exchange rely on information systems to establish familiarity, and some systems collapse when they grow to include unknown and unverifiable
merchants. See Avner Greif, The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community
Responsibility System and Impartial Justice, 20 J. Econ. Persp. 221 (2006).
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misinformation and punish any party responsible for spreading inaccurate information about another's reputation. 29 Another force
working to ensure the accuracy of reputation information is the
rigorous set of Jewish laws that strictly regulate the information
one is permitted, prohibited, and required to disclose regarding
another individual? These religious rules and community norms
help filter communications to increase their accuracy-deterring
the spread of inaccurate and unnecessary information-without
unduly preventing the dissemination of useful information. In a
world where good reputations are so critical to commercial success,
and where gossip can be so damaging, these filters are important in
discouraging the aimless spread of information of questionable veracity.
These enforcement mechanisms-industry arbitrators that disseminate information and merchants and community leaders that
coordinate punishment-highlight how the diamond industry's reliance on private ordering differs dramatically from the conventional demand for private third-party arbitration. In most commer29In

one case, a dealer falsely accused another of stealing his stone. He later real-

ized that he actually misplaced the stone and apologized to the dealer, but the accusation had already become common knowledge. The second dealer then brought the
first before the arbitration committee for impugning his reputation, and the board ordered the false accuser to make a public apology and donate fifty thousand dollars to
a Jewish charity. Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 127.
"Jewish law imposes three distinct prohibitions: "knowingly communicating false,
negative statements about another" (motzi shem rah), "making unflattering, but true,
remarks about a person for no reason" (lashon harah), and "recounting to a person
gossip heard about him" (rekhilut). Michael J. Broyde, The Pursuit of Justice and
Jewish Law: Halakhic Perspectives on the Legal Profession 77 (1996) (citing Maimonides, Deot 7:1-7). Thus, Jewish law forbids individuals from knowingly disseminating
false and damaging information about others, and it also requires individuals to have
compelling reasons for sharing information that, even if truthful, is damaging or unflattering to another. Jewish law does not, however, forbid communicating reputation
information that is necessary to sustain a merchant's livelihood. To the contrary, Jewish law mandates the sharing of damaging yet truthful reputation information if such
information would be of substantial use to the recipient, so long as it is not exaggerated, is shared only because it would aid the recipient, and is shared only to the degree necessary to assist the recipient. Cf. id. at 77-78 (describing the necessary conditions for lawyers to repeat damaging information about another); Richman, supra
note 5, at 402 (discussing the ways in which these norms support economic exchange).
Even though Jewish law only has loose influence on DDC arbitrators, these religious
precepts on handling reputational information pervade as social norms within the
merchant community and affect both behavior and the perception of others. See
Richman, supra note 5, at 402.
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cial settings, parties contractually agree on arbitration to reduce
the collective costs of dispute resolution. When a dispute arises, the
parties proceed to arbitration and receive a judgment, which the
victorious party can then enforce against a noncompliant party in
state-sponsored court. The Federal Arbitration Act3 ' (like similar
statutes in other countries) requires that public courts defer to the
arbitrators' ruling, but the legal instruments of state-sanctioned coercion, such as asset seizure and property liens, remain available to
enforce the arbitration judgment. Although these public mechanisms are useful for recovering identifiable and fixed assets, they
are far less effective in recovering stolen diamonds, which can easily escape a court's detection and jurisdiction. The diamond industry, therefore, has developed private instruments to enforce contracts and achieve transactional security. In short, whereas most
commercial parties choose arbitration to reduce the costs of litigating in public courts, the diamond industry abandons public courts
because they offer ineffective enforcement. And whereas the effectiveness of most commercial arbitration depends on ultimate state
court enforcement, the diamond industry designs its own arbitration rules to harness its reputation mechanisms and coordinated
punishments.
In sum, the DDC's arbitrators identify merchants who have engaged in wrongdoing, and both formal and informal industry
mechanisms disseminate the identities of those deserving of bad
reputations. Industry and community norms then inflict coordinated punishment on wrongdoers by foreclosing future business to
those who have failed to uphold their commitments in the past.
This collection of industry and community institutions has sustained a sixty-billion-dollar industry that has avoided, has not required, and could not be supported by state court enforcement.
Could the institutional foundations for the industry's procompetitive reputation-based enforcement nevertheless amount to an antitrust violation?

" 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).

Virginia Law Review

340
II. THE ANTITRUST

[Vol. 95:325

ANALYSIS: TACIT COLLUSION, ESSENTIAL

FACILITIES, AND INFORMATION SHARING

It might be said that a clever antitrust attorney can find violations in even the most procompetitive behavior." In fact, finding an
antitrust violation in the conduct by the DDC and its members
might require very little cleverness. The industry's reputation
mechanism is a product of a horizontal agreement among competitors and, depending on how the agreement is characterized, is in
tension with several doctrines in antitrust law. Based on the facts
previously presented this Part identifies potential diamond industry
antitrust violations.
A. Group Boycotts & Tacit Collusion
The diamond industry's reputation mechanism is a coordinated,
multilateral effort to punish bad behavior. In this respect, it is similar to court judgments for breached contracts, since both are instruments to punish individuals who deviate from their promised
obligations. Sanctions administered by reputation mechanisms,
however, penalize breaching parties by foreclosing profitable opportunities in the future. Effective and credible prospective punishment, therefore, must be the product of a collective commitment
by enough industry members to foreclose commerce to wrongdoers. For example, if diamond merchants were regularly to transact
with a merchant who had misbehaved in the past, perhaps in exchange for a premium that is less than the profit the breaching
party enjoyed from his previous breach, then the promised sanctions from misbehavior would be inadequate to deter breach. Sanctions that are adequate to deter breach will be best achieved if all
diamond merchants refuse to deal with individuals who have misbehaved in the past, even when it means relinquishing individual
opportunities for profit (and relatedly, merchants who are known

32Cf.

Edwin S. Rockefeller, The Enduring Nature of 'Antitrust,' 81 Antitrust &

Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 257, 282 (Sept. 28, 2001) ("The reason why antitrust-as-faith
endures is not because it has a fixed basis in science or reason but because it does not.
One wants both justice and mercy.... If fairness is to prevail, the plaintiff wins; if efficiency is the goal, the defendant wins. The law is no guide for decision.").
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to transact with parties with
bad reputations must also be subject to
3
punishment)
a collective
The reputation mechanism is thus tantamount to a group boycott, or a horizontal agreement among diamond merchants-who
are competitors-to refuse to deal with bad industry actors. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such agreements are illegal per se. In Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, a horizontal agreement that was orchestrated to block sales to a particular retailer
prompted the Court to declare that "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted
refusals to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the
forbidden category [of restraints]."' The Court has condemned
with equal vigor horizontal agreements that arise out of industry
associations designed to boycott competitors who introduce alternative business practices. In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n. v. United States, the Court ruled against an association of
lumber retailers who refused to deal with vertically integrated
wholesalers,35 and in American Medical Ass'n v. United States, the
Court invalidated the AMA's policy (which claimed to preserve
professional standards and ethics) of expelling any physician who
worked for a nonprofit health maintenance organization. 6 These
rulings are part of a long line of Supreme Court cases declaring

3"
There are, of course, exceptions to the general practice of refusing to deal with
anyone who has misbehaved, and the industry has mechanisms that distinguish malicious breaches from breaches that are products of miscalculations or other errors. In
these latter instances, the administered punishments are more forgiving, and leading
community or industry members might make efforts to rehabilitate a breaching merchant's reputation. In short, these rules are not absolute, nor should one expect them
to be given the frailties and lenience of human nature. But the exceptions are few and
far between to ensure that the impending punishment adequately deters deviation
and supports equilibrium of cooperation. See Richman, supra note 5, at 402-03 &
n.50.
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). The Court clarified
in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998), that the illegal conduct in
Kor's was the horizontal agreement among competing manufacturers, not the vertical
exclusivity demanded by one of the retailers. See NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 135-36.
" 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914) (holding that a retailer who circulates a blacklist of dealers among a professional association "exceeds his lawful rights, and such action brings
him and those acting with him within the condemnation of the act of Congress.. ").
3 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (affirming conspiracy convictions under the Sherman Act).
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that horizontal agreements to orchestrate group boycotts are illegal
per se."
The case that is perhaps closest to the diamond industry's boycotts is Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, in
which an association was found to have violated the Sherman Act
when it refused to sell to retailers that purchased from pirating
competitors.' Even though the association claimed its practices
were "reasonable and necessary" to assert their alleged rights under the Copyright Act (and even though one could plausibly consider such practices to have a procompetitive purpose), the Court
upheld the FTC's refusal to consider the reasonableness of the association's conduct. It concluded, in an expansive ruling, that "the
reasonableness of the methods pursued by the combination.., is
no more material than would be the reasonableness of the prices
fixed by unlawful combination."39 The Court specifically condemned the Guild for engaging in self-help, ruling that "even if
copying were an acknowledged tort under the law of every state,
that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to
regulate and restrain interstate commerce in violation of federal
law. ,"'
The per se rule against group boycotts contracted slightly in
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, in which the Court clarified that "the per
se rule [is] applicable in certain group boycott cases."41 The Court
approvingly cited the circuit court's ruling that "'the per se rule'
would apply only if no 'pro-competitive justification' were to be
found," 2 and it cited Areeda & Hovenkamp to confirm that "justifications are routinely considered in defining the forbidden cate" See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990)
(holding that per se rules "have the same force and effect as any other statutory commands"); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 n.15 (1982) (reaffirming that group boycotts are "unlawful in and of themselves"); Fed. Maritime
Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968) ("[A]ny
agreement by a group of competitors to boycott a particular buyer or a group of buyers is illegal per se."); 13 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 2203 n.1 (1999) (listin, cases).
312 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1941).
39
Id. at 468.
40Id.

'NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134 (1998) (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 136 (citing Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1061 (2d. Cir.
1996)).
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gory" of group boycotts.43 The murky rule that emerges from Fashion Originators'Guild and NYNEX is that although group boycotts
face heightened scrutiny (if not classic per se treatment) under the
antitrust laws, procompetitive justifications could make group refusals permissible. Self-help efforts to protect legitimate legal interests, however, are not excused if they rest on objectionable restraints of trade. Thus, the diamond industry's efforts to self-police
legal contracts, even if necessitated by court failures, and perhaps
even if such self-policing has procompetitive justifications, would
have difficulty escaping antitrust liability under a strict application
of the current caselaw.
The immediate defense to the charge that the diamond dealers
have organized a horizontal agreement to exclude certain rivals is,
simply, that there is no actual agreement. To be sure, membership
in the DDC requires signing onto the association's By-Laws, which
constitute an agreement, but nothing in the By-Laws prohibits
members from dealing with merchants who have shirked past contractual obligations.' However, the practice of refusing to deal with
individuals who have breached, despite the obvious profit opportunities for members who would cross the boycott, indicates that
each individual member works against his business interests in
abiding by the group boycott. Thus, there is support for a finding of
tacit collusion or an implied agreement.
The Supreme Court allowed for the possibility that an illegal
conspiracy could be inferred without direct proof of an agreement
in Interstate Circuit,Inc. v. United States.45 Interstate Circuit, a significant movie exhibitor, asked eight competing film distributors to
impose certain demands on all exhibitors in Interstate's region. Interstate's request came as a single letter that named all eight dis43

Id. (quoting 7 Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law 1510 (1986)).
44In fact, the DDC By-Laws include a provision regarding restraints of trade: "The
Organization shall not: adopt any resolution, rule, regulation or By-Law which illegally attempts to restrain trade or violate the law." DDC By-Laws, supra note 16, art.
XVI. This provision was added to the DDC By-Laws as part of a consent decree that
followed an antitrust action brought by the Department of Justice, see infra notes
157-61 and accompanying text. Adding the Restraint of Trade provision did not
change the DDC's method of operation, and thus had little impact on whether the
DDC and its members had in fact been executing an illegal restraint of trade. And, of
course, competitors who agree not to violate the antitrust laws are not immunized
from antitrust liability.
" 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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tributors as recipients, so each distributor knew the others were receiving the same demands. The distributors all acceded to Interstate's demands, which gave Interstate's first-run theatres greater
exclusivity and increased both Interstate's and the distributors'
profits. Even though there was no evidence that the distributors
communicated directly or indirectly with each other, the Court
found sufficient evidence of an illegal horizontal agreement, concluding, "[i]t was enough that, knowing that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to
the scheme and participated in it." 6 Since the letter coincided with
a significant change in the distributors' business practices, and
since each distributor faced "risk of a substantial loss" if it pursued
these new practices unilaterally, the Court continued,
we are unable to find in the record any persuasive explanation,
other than agreed concert of action, of the singular unanimity of
action on the part of the distributors .... It taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors would, in the circumstances,
have accepted and put into operation with substantial unanimity
such far-reaching changes in their business methods without
some understanding that all were to join ....
Areeda & Hovenkamp state the Interstate Circuit principle succinctly: "[I]f rational defendants would not act without mutual assurances of common
action, then the act proves that such assur48
ances took place.
The Court's later rulings in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.49 and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp.5" clarified that merely parallel conduct among rivals is not enough to support a finding of illegal collusion. Subsequent cases have therefore looked for what have been
called "plus factors" that might indicate where parallel behavior

' Id. at 226.
:' Id. at 222-23.
' 6 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 1426 (2d ed. 2003).
49346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) ("'[C]onscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely.").
50509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) ("Tacit collusion, sometimes called.., conscious parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power .... ) (emphasis added).
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amounts to a conspiracy." Plus factors that have been found to
transform parallelism into conspiracy, or that have allowed a jury
to so find, include frequent announcements of important information and future action,52 mechanisms to share information among
rivals,53 and policies that standardize industry practices.'
The reputation mechanism at work in the diamond industry is a
clear instance of parallel conduct that is not economically rational
without an implicit agreement, and the industry is home to many
plus factors that would lead to a finding of tacit collusion. The arbitration board's identification and announcement of a particular individual amounts to an announcement of a particular boycott target. The DDC wall and the bourse, as a gathering place for rivals
and a central conduit for information, offer useful mechanisms to
share information and coordinate concerted action. And the rigid
industry practices for orchestrating and adjudicating sales impose a
standardization that makes deviations noticeable and easy to spotlight. In short, the diamond industry offers mechanisms that enable
merchants to tacitly conspire to collectively boycott certain industry rivals. Significantly, these features-concerted action to boycott
particular actors and information mechanisms to enable such concerted action-are typical of many reputation mechanisms,55 which

5

See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Be-

cause the evidence of conscious parallelism is circumstantial in nature, courts are concerned that they do not punish unilateral, independent conduct of competitors. They
therefore require that evidence of a defendant's parallel pricing be supplemented with
'plus factors."' (citations omitted)). Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that the "inelegant term 'plus factors' refers simply to the additional facts or factors required to be
proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a conspiracy." 6
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 1433e.
" In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that advance announcements of price increases, combined with parallel pricing, support a reasonable inference of an illegal conspiracy).
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1980).
14 See, e.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v.
United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.
1952).
" See, e.g., Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1763-71 (describing the role of reputations in governing contracts in the cotton industry); cf. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1819 (1996) (discussing the grain and feed industry
and noting that "[w]hen transactors are aware that an opinion will be written if an arbitration takes place, reputation bonds will be better able to ensure that transactors
perform their obligations or settle their disputes").
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means that if the DDC is violating the Sherman Act, then other
reputation mechanisms might be in violation as well.
B. Positive Externalitiesand the Associated Press Doctrine
Even if there were no horizontal agreement to boycott certain
competitive targets illegally, the DDC is a joint venture with bylaws agreed upon by members who are in competition with one
another. In this respect, the DDC is clearly the product of a horizontal agreement among competitors. The DDC's rules, and the
substance of the agreement that amounts to the creation of the
DDC, are therefore subject to the antitrust scrutiny normally applied to joint ventures and industry associations.
Characterizing the DDC as a joint venture removes it from per
se scrutiny. The Supreme Court has determined that the automatic
per se rule is inappropriate for such purportedly procompetitive
collaborations, so joint ventures are judged under the rule of reason.56 Since the DDC is easily characterized as a collaborative
agreement between competing diamond merchants that has the
purpose and effect of achieving transactional efficiencies, the
proper antitrust analysis would weigh the DDC's procompetitive
benefits against any ancillary and unavoidable anticompetitive consequences."
To be sure, the DDC could identify many procompetitive effects
from offering competing diamond dealers a central bourse with
uniform industry rules and skilled arbitration panels." The DDC
also disseminates market information among merchants and creates a central trading floor to ensure that market prices are well
56

See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472

U.S. 284, 296 (1985) ("Unless the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive
access to an element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion
is virtually always likely to have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted."); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that blanket licenses for broadcasting copyrighted music do not warrant application of the per se rule).
" See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 786 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("We must also ask whether, despite their anticompetitive
tendencies, these restrictions might be justified by other procompetitive tendencies or
redeeming virtues.").
On the specific efficiencies created by specialized contract rules, tailored arbitration procedures, and arbitration by industry insiders, see generally Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5.
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known. Thus, like other bourses, the DDC reduces search costs for

buyers and sellers, something especially valuable for diamond
transactions since specialized preferences and in-person inspection
are important. 9 These and similar benefits of industry associations
have been recognized by the Supreme Court as legitimate reasons

for competitors to cooperate: the Court noted the procompetitive
benefits of uniform industry rules and coordination in United States
v. Terminal RailroadAss'n, ° NCAA v. Board of Regents,6 and Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.;62 recognized the
sizeable efficiencies created by centralized systems of communication and information in Silver v. NYSE 3 and Associated Press v.
United States;' and showed deference to trade association procedures and industry practices in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.
65 and Broadcast Music,
Pacific Stationery & Printing
Inc. v. CBS,
Inc.
However, as many of these cases illustrate, the benefits from industry-wide cooperation might themselves invite antitrust scrutiny
if certain competitors are left out of the productive collaboration.
If the joint venture is designed with an open infrastructure, such
that all qualifying parties may join, and if the joint venture enjoys
substantial market power and exhibits positive externalities, such
9

See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a
Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2328, 2352-53 (2004) (discussing the importance of the matching process).
6o224 U.S. 383, 403 (1912) (citing positive aspects of railroad-transfer station consolidations and recognizing their "public utility").
6'468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) ("What the NCAA and its member institutions market in
this case is competition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of course,
this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors
agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed.").
2486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (holding that "private standards can have significant
procompetitive advantages" when appropriate procedures are followed).
63373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (citing the Great Depression as an example of "how essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail as to every aspect of the Exchange's activities").
326 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1945) ("It is apparent that the exclusive right to publish news in
a given field, furnished by AP and all of its members, gives many newspapers a competitive advantage over their rivals. Conversely, a newspaper without AP service is
more than likely to be at a competitive disadvantage.").
65472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (recognizing that "cooperatives must establish and enforce reasonable rules in order to function effectively").
6441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (finding that ASCAP's "blanket license cannot be wholly
equated with a simple horizontal arrangement among competitors").
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that social welfare is increased with the addition of each additional
competitor and competitors find it difficult or impossible to compete if left out of the organization, then the Sherman Act might
prohibit the joint venture from excluding certain members. In Associated Press, for example, the Court found that newspapers excluded from the AP's shared wire service were unable to compete
with the AP's members, and it concluded that the joint venture's
restrictive membership policy stifled competition.67 Similarly, in
Silver and Allied Tube, the Court scrutinized a joint venture's decision-making structure: in Silver it prohibited the NYSE from excluding a member without evidence that its procedures and membership criteria advanced procompetitive objectives,' and in Allied
Tube it invalidated an association vote to set industry standards
because an interested party had corrupted the election.69 Trade associations that serve important roles in managing an industry's operation, whether setting industry rules or controlling access to essential facilities, may run afoul of antitrust prohibitions when
deciding to exclude certain members.
These cases suggest that the DDC's membership practices would
invite scrutiny. The efficiencies of consolidating information and
creating a central locale for exchange give DDC members a substantial advantage over nonmembers. Perhaps more important,
membership gives merchants access to the DDC arbitration panels
to enforce their agreements,' and conversely, a member may
" 326 U.S. at 9, 12 ("The joint effect of these By-Laws is to block all newspaper nonmembers from any opportunity to buy news from AP.... AP's restrictive By-Laws
had hindered and impeded the growth of competing newspapers."); see also SCFC
ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 971 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[The AP's] news gathering and dissemination capacity could not be duplicated and represented in and of
itself a limitation on nonmembers.").
6 373 U.S. at 347 (finding removal of telephone connections to traders' office deprived them of "valuable business service which they needed in order to compete effectively as broker-dealers in the over-the-counter securities market").
6'486 U.S. at 497 ("Petitioner alone recruited 155 persons ... [and] also paid over
$100,000 for the membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these voters.... None of them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in opposition, the proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to

390.").
"The DDC By-Laws give each member the right to file a complaint and request a
hearing before the DDC arbitrators. Nonmembers do not have that right. See DDC
By-Laws, supra note 16, at art. XII, § la.
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credibly commit to a contractual obligation more easily than nonmembers because members are subject to the arbitrators' rulings
and prohibited from invoking alternative mechanisms to resolve
disputes. 1 The DDC's framework thus creates positive externalities
with increased membership such that expanding membership increases industry information and broadens the reach and effectiveness of the DDC's arbitration panel. It should therefore come as
no surprise that the DDC presents itself as the home to all, not just
a selection, of the industry's important merchants. 2
Given the social benefits of broad DDC membership, and given
the competitive advantages members enjoy over nonmembers, antitrust law could impose restraints on the DDC's ability to expel
members. Associations with positive externalities and collective
market power-associations that are subject to heightened antitrust scrutiny73-are generally permitted to expel members, even if
expulsion puts the former members at severe competitive disadvantages, so long as the expulsion is pursuant to procompetitive
objectives 74 and there are no available alternatives to expulsion that
could reasonably satisfy those objectives.7 5 Exclusion from the
DDC, however, is even more severe than exclusion from other
networks because it effectively triggers a denial of all future business. Either expulsion from, or denied entry to, the DDC is evi7, Id. at art. XII, §
7

la; art. III, § 2b.
'Although prospective members must apply for membership, and their admission

is subject to a review by current members, the By-Laws state that membership is open
to all individuals engaged in the diamond trade. Id. at art. III, § 1. Presumably the
positive externalities are subject to physical capacity constraints, but nothing in the
By-Laws indicates a ceiling to membership, though the DDC has flirted with plans to
move to a larger facility. See Charles V. Bagli, Turf Battle Looms in the Diamond
District, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,2006, at 40.
71See 13 Hovenkamp, supra note 37, 2220a.
' See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296 (holding that "[t]he act of expulsion
from a wholesale cooperative does not necessarily imply anticompetitive animus" because such organizations "must establish and enforce reasonable rules in order to
function effectively."). These procompetitive justifications to limit membership include preventing free riding and compelling optimal investments from members. See
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 972 (10th Cir. 1994) (accepting the
free rider justification to exclude Dean Witter from the Visa credit card network); cf.
13 Hovenkamp, supra note 37, 2223 (criticizing the Tenth Circuit's application of
the free rider defense in SCFC ILC v. Visa).
" See SCFC ILC v. Visa, 36 F.3d at 970-71 (permitting exclusion of Dean Witter
from the Visa network because it was reasonably related to Visa's business purpose
and no broader than necessary).
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dence that the individual lacks a credible history of reliable and
trustworthy behavior. Membership is thus necessary to signal
credibility, and denial of DDC membership, like denial of AP
membership to competing newspapers, prevents excluded merchants from competing with members.76
Consequently, the antitrust question becomes whether excluding
a targeted merchant "represents the essential reason for the competitors' cooperation or reflects a matter merely ancillary to the
venture's operation; whether it has the effect of decreasing output;
and whether it affects price."" Based exclusively on those last two
standards, the traditional antitrust standards of prices and output,"8
the answer would have to be no. Additional members would increase supply and bring more price competition, whereas excluded
merchants would be unable to offer a competitive alternative. The
DDC policy of excluding targeted members instead must be justified as a necessary mechanism to secure exchange. Of course,
courts are in theory available to enforce contracts, so the DDC's
procompetitive justification must rely on the need for extralegal
punishments because of the comparative weakness, or outright
failure, of public courts.
Is a "court failure" argument a legitimate procompetitive justification under current antitrust law? The case most on-point is Fashion Originators'Guild, in which the Court squarely invalidated an
association's self-help efforts to punish allegedly tortious conduct.79
76

See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 13-14 ("The net effect is seriously to limit the

opportunity of any new paper to enter these cities. Trade restraints of this character,
aimed at the destruction of competition, tend to block the initiative which brings newcomers into a field of business and to frustrate the free enterprise system which it was
the purpose of the Sherman Act to protect.").
77SCFC ILC v. Visa, 36 F.3d at 964 ("Underlying these cases is an effort
to... assure that the procompetitive goals, in fact, are neither undervalued nor mask a reduction in competition.").
78 Traditional antitrust analysis is devoted to maximizing
economic welfare, which
pays exclusive attention to prices and output. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 784-85 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
a restraint's likely effect on prices will determine whether it is anticompetitive);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 107-08 ("Restrictions on price and output are
the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended
to prohibit."); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 19-20 ("[O]ur inquiry must focus
on ... whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output .....
' 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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Decrying the Guild as an "extra-governmental agency," the Court
refused to consider whether the group boycott had procompetitive
justifications.' The diamond industry's reputation-based enforcement system, like the Guild's enforcement mechanisms, is designed
to protect economic interests that are not reliably secured by state
courts. Unless the language in Fashion Originators'Guild is modified,81 the DDC's efforts to protect its members' legitimate contractual rights-efforts that are far more effective than using the public
courts-may lack a recognized procompetitive justification.
In sum, the centrality of the DDC subjects its membership policies to heightened antitrust scrutiny under the Associated Press
doctrine. Because the DDC is a joint venture among competitors in
which membership is vital to sustaining a profitable business, the
exclusion of certain merchants could adversely affect competition.
And since inclusive membership policies offer positive externalities
that increase both output and competition, exclusion of members
could also reduce total surplus. The Associated Press doctrine
therefore permits the DDC to exclude members only if exclusion is
pursuant to a procompetitive justification that is essential to promote the purpose of the venture. The procompetitive purpose behind exclusion is to deter and punish those who fail to comply with
their contractual obligations, but the Supreme Court has not yet
recognized extralegal punishment as a valid justification. In theory,
diamond merchants may enforce those rights in state court, but the
Supreme Court might be hesitant to sanction extralegal punishments as severe as exclusion if exclusion also has anticompetitive
consequences on prices and output.' It would seem that the DDC's
o Id. at 465 (finding the group of manufacturers to be "in reality an extragovernmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the power of the national legislature and
violates the [Sherman Act]."' (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899))).
Id. at 468 ("[E]ven if copying were an acknowledged tort under the law of every
state, that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate
and restrain interstate commerce in violation of federal law.").
2 Another reason the Supreme Court might hesitate before allowing the industry to
have such broad latitude to police itself with such severe punishments is that it might
be hard to distinguish exclusion designed to serve procompetitive goals from naked
exclusion with undeniably anticompetitive consequences. The case of Martin Rapaport might fall into the latter category. When the DDC terminated his membership
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membership policies would survive antitrust scrutiny only if the
Court is responsive to efficiency rationales on grounds that explicitly acknowledge the efficiencies of private enforcement over public ordering in state courts.
C. Sharing Information and FacilitatingAnticompetitive Practices
Even if the DDC's membership policies were to survive antitrust
scrutiny and the joint venture were permitted to exclude merchants
who did not comply with the dictates of the DDC arbitration
board, the DDC might still violate the Sherman Act if it coordinated practices that facilitated anticompetitive collusion. In certain
cases, agreements to implement "facilitating practices" can amount
to a Sherman Act violation.
A common facilitating practice that has been found to violate
the Sherman Act is an agreement between competitors to exchange information on prices or output. Such coordination draws
scrutiny because it enables illegal collusion even in the absence of
an explicit agreement to collude. For example, the Supreme Court
in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States" and United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co. ' found Section 1 violations
where industry associations had disseminated information on
prices, sales, and delivery charges. The Court concluded in both
cases that agreements to exchange such information were little
more than elaborate price fixing agreements designed "to bring
about a concerted effort to raise prices regardless of cost or
merit. '" The caselaw on such "facilitating practices" generally
scrutinizes the effects of information sharing, such as whether the
coordinated exchange leads to uniform actions or patently anticompetitive outcomes.' The Court is especially suspicious of
agreements to exchange information when they are deemed to

for distributing a newsletter that published market prices for assorted stones, Rapaport appealed to the Federal Trade Commission, which terminated its investigation
after Rapaport and the DDC reached a settlement. See infra Part IV.B.
83257 U.S. 377 (1921).

262 U.S. 371 (1923).

85

Am. Column & Lumber, 257 U.S. at 409.

13 Hovenkamp, supra note 37, 2112. Courts additionally examine contributing
factors such as market power, product homogeneity, and other features that can facilitate collusion. Id.
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trigger conduct that amounts to a per se violation, such as an
agreement to fix pricesa or output."
The Supreme Court has also condemned horizontal agreements
to exchange information when such agreements facilitate a per se
illegal group boycott. In Eastern States, where the Court found an
illegal group boycott by retailers against vertically integrated suppliers, the Court ruled that the mere circulation of a list of wholesalers who engaged in retail sales was enough to violate the
Sherman Act.' Even though the practice of distributing the names
of targeted firms was little more than an agreement to disseminate
information, the Court ruled,
There can be but one purpose in giving the information in this
form to the [retailers] .... These lists were quite commonly spoken of as blacklists .... [H]e is blind indeed who does not see the
purpose90in... this report to put the ban upon wholesale dealers ....
The DDC By-Laws constitute a horizontal agreement to exchange information with a purpose and effects that are parallel to
those that motivated the "blacklist" in Eastern States. The DDC's
arbitration board and other information mechanisms disseminate
the names of individuals who have failed to live up to their industry
commitments, and the motivation for doing so is to provoke a collective refusal to deal.9' Even if the DDC does nothing more than
disseminate information, this joint venture to share information
among competitors could amount to an antitrust violation if it triggers a concerted refusal to deal that amounts to a per se violation.'
Perhaps the best defense of the DDC's information sharing lies
in Cement ManufacturersProtective Ass'n v. United States, in which
17Id.

2112c (collecting cases).

See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 427-28 (1945) (condemning a horizontal agreement to share production "forecasts" that triggered output
quotas).
"E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
'0Id. at 608-09.
" Even the methods of disseminating the DDC's information are inflammatory: a
picture of each wrongdoer is posted publicly, not unlike "Wanted" posters in the Old
West, with the details of the breach and the amount owed. The attack on one's character is unmistakably sweeping and reminiscent of Casio's lament of the downfall of
his own reputation. See Shakespeare, supra note 2.
' See supra Section II.A.
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the Supreme Court permitted an association of cement manufacturers to investigate whether, and then to announce when, buyers
of concrete were adhering to their purchase contracts.93 The Court
concluded that the collective investigation and sharing of information on customer compliance was reasonable to avoid purchaser
fraud. However, as much as Cement Manufacturers recognizes
that preventing fraud might be a legitimate purpose for exchanging
information, the consequences of exchanging information among
diamond dealers are far more sweeping. In Cement Manufacturers,
the consequence of investigating and finding fraud was to cancel
the individual contract, 9 whereas the DDC's information dissemination is designed to trigger a sweeping boycott and is much closer
to the kind of concerted action the Sherman Act was designed to
prevent. For similar reasons, the DDC's information exchange is
also unlike more routine agreements among competitors to share
information about the credit-worthiness of certain buyers, which
are permitted under the Sherman Act even when they lead to uniform conduct if there are independent reasons for denying credit.'
When these agreements lead to uniform action, they ostensibly reflect a common perception of a credit risk posed by a certain party,
whereas DDC-facilitated boycotts are less related to specific risk
assessments and are designed instead to punish and deter certain
conduct throughout the industry.
Although the DDC's information sharing arrangements may facilitate boycotts, there are compelling reasons they should survive
antitrust scrutiny. Antitrust law is more permissive of reciprocal arrangements when the exchanged information does not concern
price or output and there is an additional recognition that credit
93268 U.S. 588 (1925).
94
Id. at 604 ("[W]e cannot regard the procuring and dissemination of information
which tends to prevent the procuring of fraudulent contracts... as an unlawful restraint of trade even though such information be gathered and disseminated by those
who are engaged in the trade or business principally concerned.").
95
Id. at 596-97, 606. The Court recognized that cancellation of the contract led to a
reduction of cement supplied, and thus had an effect on output, but this consequence
was negligible and did not transfer the agreement into one that restricted output.
96See, e.g., Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1982) (approving competitors' exchanges of credit histories and information on credit balances); Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036, 1043 (2d Cir.
1976) (permitting competitors to deny credit to buyer after sharing credit information
since their denial decisions were reached independently).
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history is expensive to produce and thus is reasonable to share.'
Moreover, many antitrust authorities would hesitate to punish the
dissemination of information that is useful to market participants. 9
Nevertheless, if the DDC's information-sharing agreement has the
purpose and effect of triggering group boycotts against targeted
competitors and is intimately linked to anticompetitive conduct,
then the agreement to share information itself could amount to an
antitrust violation. Of course, this agreement to gather and disseminate certain information on past conduct is essential to support a reputation mechanism, and without this agreement, a reputation mechanism would not be sustainable. In fact, nearly all
reputation mechanisms rely on the dissemination of information on
past conduct, and that dissemination is always designed to inform
and influence the subsequent conduct of economic actors. If the
DDC's information sharing violates the Sherman Act, then similar
reputation mechanisms might as well.
III. INSTITUTIONAL

EFFICIENCIES AS AN ANTITRUST DEFENSE

Thus, a formal application of current antitrust law presents a
number of arguments that might lead a court to conclude that New
York's diamond dealers and the DDC are in violation of the
Sherman Act. Of particular import is the possible application of
the rule in Fashion Originators' Guild, which prohibits horizontal
refusals to deal even if the restraints enjoy procompetitive justifications or are designed to vindicate legal rights.' If diamond merchants are equally limited in justifying their conduct, then antitrust
' See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and
Its Practice § 5.3b, at 219 (3d ed. 2005) ("[E]xchanges of credit information on customers, or the histories of customer dealings, are generally legal.... Exchanges of information totally unrelated to price or output generally raise no antitrust issues.").
" See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 Geo. L.J. 1187, 1199 (1979) ("A pure agreement to
exchange price information should always be considered lawful.").
As previously noted, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that the per se rule
still applies to certain horizontal group boycotts. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,
525 U.S. 128 (1998); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411, 433
(1990) ("[Wlhile the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in
part by 'administrative convenience,' . .. [t]he per se rules also reflect a longstanding
judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have 'a substantial potential for
impact on competition."' (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 16 (1984))).
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law might foreclose an efficiency analysis altogether. Additionally,
unless antitrust law permits collective self-help when courts fail and
recognizes the institutional efficiencies that make group boycotts
superior to alternative enforcement mechanisms, the diamond
merchants' concerted action might still violate the Sherman Act,
even under the rule of reason or a less sweeping per se rule.
On its face, prohibiting the diamond industry's use of reputation
mechanisms seems to transgress what might be the prime directive
of antitrust law: thou shalt not condemn agreements that enhance
consumer welfare.'" The industry relies on a reputation mechanism
because public courts are unable to enforce diamond credit sales;
therefore, the concerted refusal appears to support the sixtybillion-dollar-a-year industry. If analysis of the diamond industry
reveals that horizontal group boycotts can promote consumer welfare, then the per se rule-or even heightened antitrust scrutinyis not appropriate for these horizontal restraints."'
Even under a rule of reason analysis, however, where procompetitive justifications are permitted, the mere endurance of the industry does not confirm the desirability of group boycotts. The
question remains whether the industry's concerted refusal to deal is
a desirable (in antitrust terms, efficient) mechanism to support
diamond exchange in light of the available alternatives. This question arises from the related observations that the merchants' horizontal group boycott is not necessary to support exchange and that
the industry's reputation mechanism is not the only conceivable
privately administered instrument to assure transactional certainty.
If the industry were prohibited from organizing a reputation
mechanism to enforce contracts, the industry would avoid collapse
by seeking alternative mechanisms to support exchange.
One governance strategy that effectively secures diamond transactions is vertical integration, in which transactions are internalized
within a firm where managers can tightly supervise employees.
Other segments of the industry successfully use this strategy, with
most of the world's diamond mining and large-scale diamond cut'

101

See discussion supra note 7.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720

(2007) (holding that "[r]esort to per se rules is confined to restraints, like those mentioned, 'that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output."' (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,723 (1988))).
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ting occurring within vertically integrated firms. In fact, diamondcutting firms of all sizes have enjoyed success in monitoring employees for generations, even under strenuous and uncertain circumstances. In the years during World War II, for example, when
some of Antwerp's and Amsterdam's Jewish diamond merchants
and factory owners fled Nazi persecution, many landed in nations
such as Cuba and Mexico that had no previous history in the diamond trade. Nonetheless, many of these refugees were able to establish small cutting operations by employing local workers.1" Currently, most diamond cutting occurs in large factories in India,
Thailand, and China that employ inexpensive, low-skilled labor
and rely on governance mechanisms that include careful employee
monitoring and internal security. Mining companies also employ
common administrative mechanisms to supervise employees and
prevent theft, and the Gemological Institute of America ("GIA"),
where gemologists examine and grade diamonds within a closed,
tightly secured complex, also relies on firm-based monitoring to secure its diamond inventory. All of these large-scale operations
have the common feature of resorting to hierarchical organization
to manage large quantities of diamonds that regularly are in the
possession of workers who do not own the stones. 3 Mechanisms
'02David Federman, Diamonds and the Holocaust, 84 Modern Jeweler 39, 44-46
(1985).
'03It should be noted that many of the large-scale mining and cutting operations resort to disturbingly coercive and intrusive security mechanisms to govern these internal transactions. Many mine operators confine all employee handling of diamonds to
discrete physical locations where x-ray machines and other tools guard against employee theft. Some mines have earned notorious reputations for intrusive employee
monitoring, with South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Committee criticizing De
Beers-operated mines for forcing their employees to live away from their families in
grim hostels on the mining site. See Alex Duval Smith, The Gem Trail-DiamondsFrom Angolan Mine to Third Finger Left Hand, Indep., Feb. 13, 1999, at 18. (In De
Beers' defense, Harry Oppenheimer, who controlled the company from 1954-94, was
an outspoken critic of Apartheid as a member of South Africa's Parliament. See
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Oppenheimer Diamond Cartel May Be Forever, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1999, at C1.) Worse, the Revolutionary United Front, the rebel
movement that controls several diamond mines in Sierra Leone, brutally restrict the
movement of thousands of men and boys, who some have labeled "today's slaves."
David Buchan et al., The Deadly Scramble for Diamonds in Africa, Fin. Times, July
10, 2000, at 6. Such intense monitoring is, in part, a response to creative attempts at
theft that include workers swallowing diamonds or hiding them in the heels of their
shoes. One racket at a Namibian mine involved pigeon fanciers who recruited miners
to bring homing pigeons into the mine in lunchboxes and strap diamonds to their feet.

358

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:325

available within these firms have effectively prevented theft and
flight, and these same mechanisms should be available to New
York's merchants. Therefore, rather than relying on a voluntary
association that spreads information among the middlemen who
broker and sell diamonds to each other, 47th Street's merchants
could instead rely on an integrated firm to manage the distribution
of diamonds from producers to retailers.
If antitrust law is concerned with efficiency and consumer welfare, the legality of the diamond industry's concerted group boycotts should be determined by the institutional efficiency of the
reputation mechanism. Just as antitrust law recognizes "market
failure" justifications for certain collaborations,"° it should also
recognize a "court failure" justification that would evaluate institutional alternatives in light of a public court's inability to provide
the contractual security a merchant group requires. Antitrust law
should thus incorporate transaction costs into the efficiency analysis, move beyond the traditional and narrower antitrust inquiry
into prices and output, and employ a comparative institutional
analysis to determine the relative efficiencies of alternative mechanisms to govern transactions. To do so, it might consult Transaction Cost Economics ("TCE"), which assesses alternative mechanisms to secure transactions, including vertical integration and
"hybrids" such as reputation mechanisms, and examines and compares their relative efficiencies. °5
See Smith, supra. Large cutting factories have also earned notorious reputations for
their treatment of employees. A major diamond labor union recently issued a writ
complaining that thousands of diamond cutters in Gujarat, India, worked in conditions that violated Indian labor laws. One advocate described their employment conditions as "bonded labor." Notice to Labour Commissioner on Diamonds Workers'
Plight, Times of India, September 16, 2001, 2001 WLNR 6431832 (Westlaw). Indian
cutters are also subject to severe sanctions by their employers if suspected of stealing
diamonds. See, e.g., Rs 1 Lakh for Family of Diamond Cutter Beaten to Death in Surat, Express News Service, Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.expressindia.com/latestnews/Rs-l-lakh-for-family-of-diamond-cutter-beaten-to-death-in-Surat/303537/
("Raju Parmar, who worked as a diamond cutter with Akshar Diamonds, was severely beaten up under the suspicion that he had stolen a diamond given to him for
cutting and polishing.").
" See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-73 (1999) (finding a horizontal restraint withstands a quick look analysis because it mitigates information
asy'mmetries).
' For a modern overview of Transaction Cost Economics, see Oliver Williamson,
The Mechanisms of Governance (1996). For a comparative assessment of how vertical
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A. TransactionCost Economics and Antitrust: A Background
At its core, Transaction Cost Economics is the study of eco-

nomic organization. It understands alternative organizational
forms-the firm, the market, public bureaus, regulated franchises,
and assorted hybrids-as efforts to mitigate transactional hazards.
It approaches nonstandard and elaborate business practices as de-

liberate efforts to economize on transaction costs and achieve more
efficient governance."
Transaction Cost Economics has had a long, fairly rocky, but ultimately influential history in antitrust policy. When TCE was developing market failure explanations for vertical restraints in the
1960s and 1970s, neoclassical price theory dominated antitrust policymaking. Policymakers, led by Donald Turner, then-head of the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, were adherents to
Joe Bain's structure-performance-conduct approach to industrial
organization, which suggested that vertical restraints were evidence
0
This neoclassical economic orthodoxy bred
of market power."
deep skepticism of vertical agreements, causing enforcement agen-

cies to "pursue[] the dictates of price theory with a vengeance.""
Most vertical restraints were presumed to be anticompetitive expansions of monopoly power, and enforcement agencies regularly
condemned categories of vertical agreements such as tying arrangements, exclusive dealing contracts, territorial agreements, and
vertical mergers. Under Turner's reign, antitrust enforcement in
these areas reached its zenith, "° and he was famously quoted to
integration minimizes transaction costs in relation to "hybrids," see id. at 93-119. For
a transaction cost examination of reputation mechanisms, see id. at 151-58.
" See, e.g., id. at 3, 12, 54.
1007The foundation of this approach to neoclassical price theory was motivated by
Joe Bain's emphasis on market structure, which held that vertical restraints were evidence of monopolists aiming to expand monopoly power. See Joe S. Bain, Industrial
Organization 381 (2d ed. 1968). The DOJ's 1968 Merger Guidelines confidently noted
that "market structure generally produce[s] economic predictions that are fully adequate." Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,101, § 2 (1998).
' Alan J. Meese, Raising Rivals' Costs: Can the Agencies Do More Good Than
Harm?, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 241, 260 (2003). For a useful discussion of the dominance of neoclassical price theory in antitrust policymaking in the 1960s, see Alan J.
Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 77.
...
It was at around this time that Justice Potter Stewart remarked, "the sole consistency that I can find ... in [merger] litigation under § 7, is that the Government al-
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have said, "I approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.".... Thus the "inhospitality tradition" to both
vertical restraints and to TCE-based justifications for such restraints was born.
The inhospitality tradition culminated in the Department of Justice's 1968 merger guidelines, which forbade mergers between parties with nominal market power. Oliver Williamson, the pioneer of
TCE, later quipped that "mergers were challenged that did not remotely pose anticompetitive concerns."' Over time, however, this
hostility to vertical restraints could not withstand growing skepticism. Ronald Coase in 1972 lamented the myopia in contemporary
economic theory, saying "when an economist finds something-a
business practice of one sort or another-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.' '1 2 In addition, TCE
and other theories began generating constructive justifications for
vertical restraints, especially for vertical mergers. Oliver Williamson's 1975 book, Markets and Hierarchies, which perhaps marked
the official launch of TCE and led scholars and antitrust policy-

ways wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Oliver Williamson described antitrust enforcement at this time as "overconfident and even shrill." Williamson, supra note 105, at 306.
10Meese, supra note 108, at 260 n.98 (quoting Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections
on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. St. B.A. Antitrust L. Symp. 1, 1-2).
", Oliver Williamson, Transforming Merger Policy: The Pound of New Perspectives,
76 Am. Econ. Rev. 114, 116 (1986). The Guidelines, for example, forbade a supplying
company with 10% market share from acquiring a purchasing company with 6% market share. Guidelines, supra note 108, 13,101, §§ 12-13. Williamson does not blame
Turner alone for ill-advised policies; rather, he blames the entire field of economics.
Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years, 17
Antitrust 61, 61 (Spring 2003) ("With the benefit of hindsight, the field of industrial
organization and the enforcement of antitrust were in crisis in the 1960s.") In fact,
Williamson credits Turner for bringing economic analysis to the forefront of antitrust
policymaking, appointing economists and lawyers with economic training to top positions in the Antitrust Division and upgrading the role of economists from litigation
support to policymaking. Id. at 65 ("'Tall oaks from little acorns grow.' The seeds
planted during the Turner administration warrant more than a passing nod.").
1' Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect: Policy Issues and Research Opportunities
in Industrial Organization 59, 67 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) ("And as in this field we
are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large,
and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.").
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makers "Toward a New Institutional Economics,""' 3 pressed that
"[t]he policy implications of [institutional economics] that are of
principal concern are those having to do with antitrust...... To the
degree that policymakers consult institutional economics for matters spanning vertical integration, conglomerate organization,
dominant firms, and oligopoly, Williamson predicted that "antitrust enforcement will proceed more selectively in the future......
The transaction cost approach soon made its way into the world of
legal scholars. Robert Bork adopted a TCE approach toward understanding vertical mergers, remarking that "[w]hat antitrust law
perceives as vertical merger, and therefore as a suspect and probably traumatic event, is merely an instance of replacing a market
transaction with administrative direction because the latter is believed to be a more efficient method of coordination.""' 6 And Frank
Easterbrook, shortly before his appointment to the bench, also
embraced the TCE template when he asserted that "[t]he dichotomy between cooperation inside a 'firm' and competition in a
'market' is just a convenient shorthand for a far more complicated
'
continuum." 17
Criticism of the applied price theory approach, coupled with the
success of TCE and other institutional approaches, led the Department of Justice in 1982 to revise its guidelines for vertical
mergers substantially. The revised Guidelines expressly reflected
transaction cost reasoning, with nonstandard forms of organization
no longer creating a presumption of anticompetitiveness."' Further
revisions to the Guidelines in 1984 made antitrust policy even more
permissive toward vertical mergers, holding that vertical mergers
"3 Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization (1975). Chapter 1 is entitled, "Toward a New Institutional Economics."
' Id. at 258.
115
Id.
"' Bork, supra note 7, at 227. Bork is significantly more expansive than Williamson,
remarking that "Antitrust's concern with vertical mergers is mistaken.... The vertical
mergers the law currently outlaws have no effect other than the creation of efficiency." Id. at 226.
..Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1984). To be
fair, this remark (like Bork's, see supra note 116) embraces an approach that began
with Ronald Coase's seminal article, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386
(1937), and predated TCE.
..See Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28493 (June 30, 1982).
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are problematic only where the market structure would permit
strategic behavior, such as an instance in which a merger would
cause a barrier to entry in one of the affected markets."9 Policymakers' permissive approach to vertical agreements and mergers
has not been unwavering. For example, the FTC launched select
challenges against major vertical mergers in the 1990s, and the
Commission's stated concern that the mergers might foreclose
competition in upstream and downstream markets contained echoes of the inhospitality tradition.'2 ° Some have described the FTC's
heightened scrutiny as a product of what is called the post-Chicago
school of law and economics, which relies on more contextual and
complex economic analysis than the simpler Chicago school formulations,'2' but critics have warned that post-Chicago school theorists
threaten to undermine the substantial and valuable contributions
made by TCE."' Nonetheless, the Department of Justice has not
revised its vertical merger guidelines since 1984, and the recently
retired FTC Chairman, Timothy Muris, indicated that TCE and related organizational perspectives remain central to antitrust policymaking when he described his approach as "neither Chicago
School nor Post-Chicago, but rather 'New Institutional Economics."" 3 Regardless of the contours of the current debate, there is a
general consensus that TCE "had a major influence in changing the
Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26823, § 4.21 (June 29, 1984).
See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 120 F.T.C. 928 (1995) (permitting Silicon

1191984
120

Graphics to acquire two developers of graphic software after agreeing to consent order that required interoperability with competitors' architecture); Time Warner24, 104 (1996) (permitting Time WarnerTurner, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
Turner merger pursuant to a consent order that granted competitors access to broadcast network). The DOJ merger guidelines nonetheless remained unchanged.
,2,See John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy 4-5 (4th ed. 2004).
122Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies,
18
J. Law Econ. & Org. 95, 105 (2002) ("At the present time TCE and [the post-Chicago
school] are like passing ships in the night. The development of sound antitrust legal
rules and remedies would benefit from integrating these approaches and recognizing
that they are compliments rather than substitutes. Otherwise [the post-Chicago
school] runs the risk of returning us to the 1960s .... ).
,' Stephen Stockum, An Economist's Margin Notes: The Antitrust Writings of
Timothy Muris, 16 Antitrust 60, 60 (2002). Muris notes that NIE combines "theory
with a study of real world institutions [and] ... is heavily empirical," offering "a welcome relief for many to move away from what [he] refers to as the 'very stale' Chicago/Post-Chicago debate over economic ideology." Id.
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antitrust treatment of vertical integration and nonstandard vertical
contractual arrangements in ways that are widely viewed as being
socially beneficial."'24
Transaction cost lessons for horizontal agreements, however,
have been less explored, even as horizontal collusion remains the
paradigmatic antitrust concern. Since the agreements that bind
competing diamond dealers are quintessentially horizontal, any
TCE lessons drawn from the diamond industry can inform a more
general antitrust approach toward horizontal restraints. Moreover,
since collusion in the diamond industry is designed to solve a contracting problem, and since TCE is principally an effort to understand contracting problems, with particular focus on understanding
the challenge of credible contracting, transaction cost logic readily
offers a template with which to evaluate the efficiencies of the industry's reputation mechanism. Despite the fact that the industry's
collective action falls outside the classical TCE framework, TCE
still illuminates why collective action in the diamond industry is
both procompetitive and minimizes transaction costs when compared to institutional alternatives.
B. InstitutionalEconomics and Group Boycotts
The preferred methodology to compare alternative methods of
organization, for both TCE and many other schools of institutional
economics, is "discrete structural analysis," which compares the
24

' Joskow, supra note 122, at 103. For the view that TCE exerts a significant influence on the current Roberts Court, see Joshua D. Wright, The Chicago School,
Transaction Cost Economics and the Roberts Court's Antitrust Jurisprudence, in The
Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics (Peter G. Klein & Michael E.
Sykuta eds., forthcoming 2009), http://ssm.com/abstractid=1144883.
"See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1981)
(ruling that all horizontal agreements on price, including those setting maximum
prices, are per se illegal and noting that "horizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints"). Of course, vertical agreements-which receive less antitrust scrutiny and more attention from institutional economists-can often resemble
or facilitate horizontal agreements. See, e.g., Victor Goldberg, Free Riding on Hot
Wheels, Antitrust Bulletin, Winter 2002, at 603, 603 (describing the characterization
problems associated with Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.T.C. 415 (1998), and related cases).
Interestingly, Goldberg argues that Toys "R" Us illustrates an instance where a horizontal agreement by manufacturers to deal exclusively with one retailer, and boycott
other retailers, could amount to a procompetitive joint venture to purchase retailing
services. Id. at 612-16.
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costs and competencies of various governance mechanisms. 2 6 The
motivation behind this approach is that alternative organizational
forms have different proficiencies that make them suitable for different transactional contexts; thus, the superiority of one form over
others depends on the attributes of the transaction it is designed to
secure. For TCE, this method culminates in the "discriminating
alignment" hypothesis, which holds that governance structures
align with transactions such that transaction costs are minimized.127
Accordingly, the attributes of both vertical integration and group
boycotts can be compared, and an evaluation of how each secures
governance while minimizing transaction costs can reveal why New
York's diamond merchants have selected the latter.
TCE teaches that vertical integration supplies transactional security that contract law or market mechanisms cannot provide, but
vertical integration also imposes countervailing costs." Resting on
Frederich Hayek's insights into the benefits of market organization, TCE observes that vertical integration leads to a loss in incentive intensity, whereas market-based organizations maintain acute
incentives and enable rapid adaptation to demands for economic
change. Accordingly, TCE observes a tradeoff between incentive
intensity and transactional security when organizing activity within
markets and firms. Assorted "hybrids" that occupy the spectrum
between markets and hierarchies reflect the gradual tradeoff, and
these intermediate governance mechanisms enjoy greater transactional security than markets, yet more incentive intensity than the
vertically integrated firm.129
At first glance, the diamond industry's coordinated system of
private ordering might seem to enjoy the benefits of both markets
and vertical integration. On the one hand, the economic actors who
transact in diamond sales are individual merchants who, unencum" See Williamson, supra note 105, at 94-101. The method of comparing institutional
alternatives goes back to Herbert Simon, who encouraged departing from "highly
quantitative analysis" and instead employing "a much more qualitative institutional
analysis, in which discrete structural alternatives are compared." Id. at 94 (quoting
Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1, 6 (1978)).
.27
Id. at 46-47.
"s Id. at 103. Since vertical integration is at an extreme on a spectrum of governance
mechanisms, it is usefully thought of as a "last resort." Id.
29Id. at 104-05.
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bered by the bureaucratic costs of vertical integration, feverishly
monitor market information and attentively respond to opportunities. ° On the other hand, the industry's use of coordinated boycotts effectively punishes contract breaches and thus assures transactional security. Two features, however, distinguish the diamond
dealers' private ordering from other governance mechanisms
within the traditional TCE framework. The first is that the industry's agreements are between merchants and therefore constitute
horizontal agreements, whereas TCE canonically deals with the
vertical relation (and addresses what is classically called "the question of vertical integration" 1 '). The second is that the diamond industry's network is a product of a multilateral agreement,
whereas
32
TCE focuses on the individual bilateral transaction.
These departures from the traditional framework require a slight
modification to the standard TCE tradeoff between transactional
security and incentive intensity. Whereas multilateral private ordering might enjoy both, it also introduces transaction costs of another sort. Multilateral private ordering empowers private actors to
exclude unknown or unfamiliar parties from a commercial network, and though the ability to exclude is at the core of the reputation mechanism-and thus central to securing transactions-it
closes the industry to many benefits of competition. The ability to
exclude introduces the danger that the commercial network will
become a cartel that colludes on output, prices, or suboptimal
business standards. Early illustrations of how cooperation breeds

' Brokers and agents are often employed for diamond sales, creating some agency
costs, but brokerage arrangements are products of contract and do not reflect an integrated employment relationship. Moreover, brokers generally are motivated by commissions and are in steady communication with the owners of the stones they possess.
Thus, the brokerage contracts are designed to harness the power of market incentives
while minimizing agency costs. See Richman, supra note 5, at 415. The Bourse's organization is responsible for supporting contracts that economize on these assorted
transaction costs.
"' Williamson, supra note 113, at 6; see generally id. at 82-131.
132For example, Williamson notes that for John R. Commons, "the transaction
was
held to be the ultimate unit of economic investigation." Id. at 3 (citing John R. Commons, 1 Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Society 4 (1934)). One characterization of the firm is as a "nexus of contracts," see, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 290 (1980), but even this
perspective views the "contracts" as a series of vertical relationships stemming from a
principal.
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anticompetitive collusion include some Medieval merchant guilds,
such as the German Hansa, that initially facilitated welfareenhancing contract enforcement but gradually slipped into welfarereducing monopolistic behavior. "3 Exclusivity also closes the industry to potential innovators or outside talent that could introduce
dynamism and discontinuous improvements. Much of the literature
on discontinuous innovation, for example, indicates that dramatic
improvements in efficiency and value tend to be introduced by new
entrants rather than incumbents." Finally, as many antitrust cases
illustrate, empowering private industry actors to exclude competitors introduces the substantial danger that that power will be
abused, perhaps to replace market forces with the ill-informed
judgment of industry leaders, or worse, to protect the private benefits of industry insiders.'
For these reasons, systems of commerce that rely on personal
exchange and multilateral private ordering-which are subject to
the costs of exclusivity-suffer from significant dynamic inefficiencies. Economic history has shown that enforcement mechanisms
that employ reputational sanctions and support personal exchange
tend to succumb to systems of impersonal exchange, which Avner
Greif calls "the hallmark of the modern economy."'3 6 Much of the
historical movement toward impersonal exchange was driven by
incentives to expand trade and create wealth by including traders
from unfamiliar communities. "7 Many departures from private sys33
' Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modem Economy: Lessons from
Medieval Trade 122 (2006) ("Thus a merchant guild that had facilitated trade in the
late medieval period was transformed into a monopolistic organization that hindered
trade expansion during the pre-modern period.").
1
See, e.g., Clayton M. Christensen & Richard S. Rosenbloom, Explaining the Attacker's Advantage: Technological Paradigms, Organizational Dynamics, and the
Value Network, 24 Res. Pol'y 233,255 (1995) ("When architectural or radical innovations redefine the level, rate and direction of progress of an established technological
trajectory, entrant firms have an advantage over incumbents."); Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing
Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 Admin. Sci. Q. 9
(1990) (discussing the challenges posed to established firms when new entrants bring
innovation to a market).
131See supra notes 35-38, 60-69 and accompanying
text.
36
Avner Greif, Coercion and Exchange: How Did Markets Evolve? 11 (working
parer, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304204.
Greif, supra note 133, at 311 ("Arguably, reputation-based institutions that support personal exchange have a low fixed cost but a high marginal cost of exchanging
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tems of personal exchange were also a function of the structural
costs of exclusivity. Systems of personal exchange that relied on
familiarity also encountered size constraints, for example, and
therefore could not capture the benefits of scale and diversity.
Since there are limits to the number of individuals with whom merchants can be familiar and can trust, the growth of certain merchant circles limited the ability to verify a trading partner's reputation and thus eroded the credibility of personal exchange. Thus,
some systems of personal exchange failed to compete with impersonal exchange because they could not grow fast enough, and others failed because they grew beyond their capacities."'
Introducing the costs of exclusivity into the standard tradeoff between transactional security and incentive intensity yields the comparative institutional analysis reflected in Table 1.39 The table suggests that both vertical integration and multilateral private
ordering are superior to market transactions supported by statesponsored courts when public courts offer inadequate transactional
security. More important, the table posits that multilateral private
ordering is superior to vertical integration when the costs of exclusivity are lower than the incentive-diluting costs of vertical integration.

with unfamiliar individuals. Law-based institutions, which enable impersonal exchange, have a high fixed setup cost but a low marginal cost for establishing new exchange relationships.").
138Greif, supra note 28, at 222 (2006) ("By fostering impersonal exchange and institutional development, the community responsibility system laid the basis for its own
replacement by overarching systems of law-based exchange."); see also id. at 231
("Ironically, the [community responsibility] system seems to have undermined itself;
the processes it fostered were those that increased trade and urban growth-the
causes of its decline.").
For a broader comparative institutional analysis, as well as a discussion of how
...
this model fits into the separate literatures on private ordering and transaction cost
economics, see Richman, supra note 59.
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Public Courts,

Multilateral

Vertically

Arms-Length
Exchange

Private
Ordering

ertically
Integrated Firm

+

+

Transactional
Security; Low-Cost

Enforcement

Nonexclusivity

+

Incentive Intensity

+

+

+

Table 1-Institutional Alternatives and Associated Attributes
Applying this template to the diamond industry explains why the
industry's system of coordinated punishment is a more efficient enforcement mechanism than the alternatives-and why it should
therefore be permissible under antitrust law. First, the paramount
importance of transactional security for diamond merchants is
highlighted by the extreme costs of potential thefts-this explains
the undesirability of publicly ordered market exchange. Second,
and more significant, the diamond industry is a paradigmatic setting in which the gains from maintaining high-powered incentives
outweigh the costs of exclusivity. Adding value to a particular diamond is largely dependent on collecting market information, exposure to market pressures, and the capacity for spontaneous adaptation. This is a consequence of the heterogeneity of diamonds, with
each stone presenting tacit qualities that create significant variation
in the ultimate buyer's willingness to pay. Heterogeneous valuation
means that finding an optimal buyer for a specific stone is a very
profitable enterprise, and thus diamond merchants use market information to search for the optimal buyer for each stone and purchase stones for arbitrage. This matching process-the search for
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the "right" buyer-requires sellers and brokers to gather market
information regarding buyer demand and pair buyers' idiosyncratic
0 In this reneeds with the distinct qualities of available stones.""
spect, the DDC is purely a commodities exchange, and like other
exchanges, it assembles individual traders in a central facility
where market information is gathered and sellers and buyers
gather together to form a frenetic, high-volume spot market. More
generally, the DDC and the organizational structure of New
York's diamond merchants exemplify a common template for exchange houses of all kinds, where merchants and market information are assembled to facilitate an optimal matching process.
Meanwhile, the costs of exclusivity have not been as severe for
the diamond industry as they would be for most others. Although
the diamond industry is open only to those who, either through an
earned reputation or family connections, can credibly commit to a
credit sale,' the number of merchants in various diamond centers
approaches levels at which collusion or coordination would be difficult, despite the assorted community connections that many
members share (the New York DDC, for example, is home to
nearly two thousand members' 2 ). Moreover, the nature of the industry suggests that there are limits to the benefits of technological
innovation. The process of matching individual stones with tacit
and idiosyncratic preferences-the force responsible for the structure of the distribution system-largely rests on the need for in"0The matching process is somewhat complicated by a buyer's need to examine a
diamond personally and carefully in order to arrive at a personal valuation, so execut-

ing sales requires bringing diamonds to a prospective buyer for inspection. This is another reason why the diamond industry relies on a central trading area. Even as sales
have globalized and some merchants have managed to use the Internet to execute
sales, in-person inspection is still highly preferred. Accordingly, the industry has expanded by creating more diamond bourses.
141 Since a good reputation is a prerequisite to entering into and succeeding in the
industry, yet success is the primary avenue to attain a good reputation, the emphasis
on reputations reinforces the industry's exclusivity. Good reputations, however, can
also be bequeathed, and so the diamond industry has remained vibrant by allowing

generations of entry by family members. Ethnic identity can also serve as a credible
assurance of trustworthiness, and members of a close-knit community can also enter.
These family and community institutions not only explain the homogeneous composition of today's diamond market, but they also explain how community institutions can
bestow a competitive advantage for members over nonmembers. See Richman, supra
note 5, at 410-11.
142
See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 119.
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person inspection, and modern-day diamond cutting requires separate attention to each stone. Thus, there are meaningful limits on
how much an innovation could achieve economies of scale.4 3
More important, even though the industry's system of wholesale
distribution-where the reputation mechanisms are at work-is
closed to outsiders, other distribution channels are available to
lead diamonds from mine to jewelry manufacturer. Other bourses
compete with the DDC, and some Internet marketers have tried to
forge alternative distribution systems. Additionally, the industry is
not entirely closed to merchant networks that have extralegal
methods of securing exchange, and the industry has witnessed entry by ethnic groups able to adopt and sustain the industry's reputation mechanisms.'" Thus, even though the DDC's particular distribution network might be exclusive, alternative distribution
systems can-and have-entered the global market. Nonetheless,
the ethnic-based system of diamond distribution, which Jewish
diamond merchants have maintained for several centuries, has remained intact despite these competitive threats and other economic challenges.' 5 Only the boldest conspiracy theorist would
suggest that entry barriers could secure a stranglehold over an industry for nearly a millennium and through the associated technological innovations, historical upheaval, and political change. The
survival of those networks is more likely a function of their superiority over, not their insulation from, market challengers.
143There are certain efforts to codify and categorize stones so that their
values can
be known without inspection. For example, certification and grading by the Gemological Institute of America (GIA) and other grading organizations can suggest a
stone's value, but these processes still leave room for substantial variation, forcing
buyers to continue resorting to in-person purchases. See Russell Shor, Diamond
Grading Reports: Flawless or Imperfect?, Jewelers Circular Keystone, July 1 1995,
http://www.jckonline.com/article/CA6258319.html (noting that "[i]t's no trade secret
that diamonds can get different grading reports or 'certificates' from different labsor even the same lab").
'4 Although entry is essentially impossible for most individuals, the industry does
appear to permit entry to groups who can sustain the industry's reputation mechanism
credibly. Indian merchants who are Palanpuri Jain, an insular sect that has a history of
cutting diamonds and other gemstones, have managed to acquire approximately ten
percent of New York's diamond market. This does not minimize the severity of the
industry's entry barriers, but it does indicate that membership to a group where community institutions can facilitate collective sanctions offers a competitive advantage
over generic entrants. See Richman, supra note 5, at 410-11.
"' See id. at 385-89.
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To be sure, the costs of exclusivity to the diamond industry-and
ultimately to diamond consumers-are certainly positive and quite
significant. For example, the industry's exclusivity means it cannot
recruit at business schools or elsewhere to collect top business talent, and it is largely insulated from consumer preferences, especially from consumers who are not connected with the ethnic
groups that dominate the industry. Moreover, exclusivity might be
responsible for protecting ossified practices, incremental thinking,
and conformity. Chaim Even-Zohar, a gadfly and widely respected
diamond industry analyst, calls the diamond industry "an opaque,
fragmented, and complacent value chain" that has failed "to come
to terms and to respond to changing societal norms, more exacting
consumer demands, and fierce competition for the consumer's surplus disposal income."'" He explains that even as the world jewelry
market began to decline in the 1990s,
The diamond manufacturers and traders saw no compelling need
for change. Decades of reliance by virtually all players in the
value chain on the price support provided by the rough supplier's
cartel operations (which had always assured long-term profitability through maintaining supply and demand disequilibria) had
stifled entrepreneurship. There was very little risk-taking associated with bold and innovative marketing programs ....
"'
Thus, exclusivity imposes costs even on the diamond industry,
and multilateral private ordering is by no means a costless enforcement mechanism. Yet the transaction cost approach evaluates
real-world structural alternatives, not costless hypotheticals, and a
comparative institutional analysis of the available alternatives suggests that the concerted group boycott is the mechanism that most
efficiently meets the industry's need for transactional security. If
institutional efficiencies were incorporated into an antitrust analysis of the diamond merchants' exclusive conduct, the multilateral
enforcement system would accurately be regarded as an effort to
secure transactions while minimizing transaction costs. Consequently, if the rule of reason were applied, coordinated punishment

" Chaim Even-Zohar, From Mine to Mistress 1 (rev. ed. 2007).

147Id.
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in the diamond industry would be deemed a procompetitive collaboration rather than an instance of anticompetitive collusion.
More generally, this institutional analysis reveals systematic procompetitive features of concerted refusals to deal. A tradeoffs
analysis confirms that systems of multilateral private ordering impose certain transaction costs of their own, but it also reveals that
these mechanisms offer transactional security under high-powered
market incentives and thus can enforce contracts at lower transaction cost than alternative mechanisms. Multilateral private ordering introduces other costs, but those costs should be evaluated
within a comparative assessment that recognizes the corresponding
benefits. Accordingly, antitrust law should approach group boycotts and other forms of multilateral private ordering with less inhospitality than is prescribed by current caselaw. It should continue
to move away from the per se rule, consider whether particular
boycotts arise as solutions to difficult transactional challenges, and
employ institutional economics in assessing their relative efficiency.
C. Extensions: AdditionalApplications of InstitutionalEconomics
& Antitrust

Applying institutional economics to horizontal group boycotts,
such as the collaboration that creates the enforcement system for
New York's diamond merchants, expands its application beyond
the conventional inquiries into vertical agreements. And just as institutional economics has already had a significant influence on antitrust policy toward vertical restraints, it also offers broader lessons for antitrust policy toward horizontal restraints. Incorporating
institutional analysis to antitrust policy would encourage policymakers to understand the economic forces that affect organizational forms and ownership structures, thus generating useful tools
to evaluate the competitiveness of certain market structures.
For example, the analysis of the DDC suggests more generally
that antitrust law should take a more lenient approach to multilateral collaborations with market power. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, which applied the Sherman Act to a purchasing cooperative that expelled one of its members, the Court ruled that the
cooperative was not subject to the per se rule and remanded to the
appellate court for a review of the district court's rule of reason
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analysis." Even as the Court limited the applicability of the per se
rule, however, it noted that the rule still applied to cooperatives
with market power or exclusive access to an element that is essential to compete.149 The DDC might very well fall into this category-its merchants control nearly all of the national diamond
market; it is the gateway to essential market information; and
membership is a necessary credential to compete. Nonetheless, it is
a collaboration that is necessitated by the transactional difficulties
in diamond sales.
Another doctrine on horizontal restraints that institutional economics might influence is the reliance on what might be called the
"essential" requirement. The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the per se rule that applies to collaborations that "are
essential if the product is to be available at all." 5' In NCAA, the
Court held that per se treatment of restraints that governed teams
in an athletic league was inappropriate because such restraints
were essential to offer the marketed product. ' A similar approach
was employed by the Tenth Circuit in SCFC ILC v. Visa, which
ruled that the network of banks that offer Visa credit cards was not
obligated to include a financial institution that also offered a competing credit card since the collaborative's exclusive rules were
"necessary" to prevent competitors from free-riding. 52' Institutional
economics suggests that the requirement of necessity should be relaxed. Even if certain restrictive organizations are not essential to
producing certain services, their restraints might still serve procompetitive ends. The DDC and its reputation mechanism, for ex-

" Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,

297-98 (1985).
"'Id. at 298 ("A plaintiff seeking application of the per se rule must present a
threshold case that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to have pre(S]ome showing must be made that the coopdominantly anticompetitive effects ....
erative possesses market power or unique access to a business element necessary for
effective competition.").
'. 0NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
'

Id. at 117 ("[A] certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of competi-

tion that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is to be preserved.").

"'SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Visa USA
urges its concern about protecting the property it has created over the years and preventing Sears and American Express, successful rivals, from profiting by a free ride
does not represent a refusal to deal or group boycott but is reasonably necessary to
ensure the effective operation of its credit card services.").

374

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 95:325

ample, are not essential to support diamond trade since vertical integration is a feasible alternative, but they are efficient arrangements of distribution. An examination of institutional efficiency,
rather than a determination of necessity, might offer a reason for
an even narrower application of the per se rule.
Underlying the "essential" requirement is some confusion behind whether to approach the ownership structure of certain industries from an ex ante or ex post approach. Joint ventures are primarily deemed essential to support a product when an ownership
structure is presumed to be exogenous. Areeda and Hovenkamp,
for example, conclude:
In sum, then, joint ventures are artificial devices that represent
an efficient method of engaging in enterprise given a particular
set of assumptions about ownership. The relevant antitrust policy
questions focus not on whether alternatives to the venture are
theoretically possible, but on whether the existing venture restrains competition unnecessarily, given the ownership arrangements that already exist."'
Institutional economics, however, teaches that ownership arrangements are efficient responses to transaction costs and other
market forces. They are thus as much consequences as they are
drivers of market conditions. A particular ownership structure,
therefore, should not delimit the antitrust analysis; on the contrary,
comparing the efficiencies of a particular ownership structure with
its alternatives should be at the core of the analysis. This ex post
perspective on ownership and market structure perspective was a
common mistake of the early price theorists and has apparently
been repeated by some in the post-Chicago school. Paul Joskow,
for example, attributes the Court's mistaken analysis in Kodak v.
Image Technical Services to placing undue emphasis on the ex post
relational situation while ignoring the more important ex ante
competition. He warns that perpetuating this ill-advised approach
"could turn antitrust policy.., back to where it was in the 1960s or
worse." 154
13 Hovenkamp, supra note 37, 2220b2.
l Joskow, supra note 122, at 108. Applying the ex ante institutional approach to
sports leagues, for example, would require antitrust policy to examine why most
leagues are joint ventures of independently owned teams, rather than divisions of a
"5
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In sum, antitrust law does not have an explicit recognition of institutional efficiencies when it evaluates horizontal restraints, but
institutional economics and, specifically, TCE have much to offer.
These institutional approaches suggest that certain concerted refusals to deal among competitors reflect procompetitive efforts to
minimize transaction costs, such as securing transactions while
maintaining the power of market incentives. To the degree that
current antitrust law demands procompetitive justifications from
horizontal collaborations, it usually looks for efficiencies motivated
by price theory (such as standard setting or network externalities).155 It should also look for institutional efficiencies and permit
TCE to inform both the limited application of the per se rule and
the implementation of the rule of reason analysis.
IV. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND DIAMOND DEALERS:
APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON

The previous Part suggests not only that concerted refusals
should be judged under the rule of reason but also how the rule of
reason should be applied. The anticompetitive consequences of
group boycotts are to be evaluated against their procompetitive
justifications, and among those justifications is the recognition that
coordinated boycotts serve to deter contract breach when public
courts are ineffective. Group boycotts should accordingly be permitted under the Sherman Act when they arise to compensate for
court failures and when an institutional economic analysis determines that they are more efficient than alternative private ordering
mechanisms.
One of the dangers of multilateral private ordering, however, is
that the private power to exclude could be abused, and antitrust
law should attempt to distinguish between group boycotts employed for procompetitive and anticompetitive ends. The contemporary history of New York's diamond industry reveals that the
same mechanisms that foster transactional security efficiently have

single entity. Approaching these ownership allocations as efforts to economize would
inform the antitrust scrutiny of the subsequent collaboration.
155See, e.g., Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, Fed.
Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice §§ 2.1, 3.36 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOO/O4/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
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also imposed the costs of exclusivity. This Part reveals that industry
leaders have used the arbitration and boycott mechanisms to advance noneconomic purposes, target innovators or industry nonconformists who might unsettle the current economic hierarchy,
and obtain preferential treatment for purely personal gain. Perhaps
the primary lesson from this history is, as TCE teaches, that governance mechanisms introduce tradeoffs, and that the costs of certain institutional arrangements should be recognized alongside
their benefits. This lesson extends to antitrust law as well. Antitrust
should recognize both the benefits and the drawbacks of various
multilateral enforcement mechanisms, avoid both categorical condemnation (which is reflected in per se rule) and approval (which is
given by some scholars156), and evaluate the legality of particular
boycotts based on their economic purpose and effect.
A. United States v. Diamond Center, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
In 1942, two years after the Nazi invasion of Belgium devastated
Antwerp's diamond industry, confiscating its remaining assets and
sending its many Jewish dealers to concentration camps, the New
York Diamond Dealers Club passed a resolution that prohibited
admission to all individuals associated with Nazi organizations and
business interests. "7 In 1949, when more than eighty percent of
"S6
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 108, 113-14 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("In sum,
private legal systems increase the value of transactors' written contracts [by improving
quality and reducing the costs of adjudication]. However, they also play an even more
important role in increasing the value of the extralegal aspects of contracting relationships by, among other things, increasing the effectiveness of reputation bonds and
other nonlegal sanctions."); Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369 , 444 (2002) ("[P]eer production has a systematic
advantage over markets and firms in matching the best available human capital to the
best available information inputs in order to create information products."). Even
Robert Ellickson's seminal and widely respected Order Without Law credits tight-knit
groups for "maintain[ing] norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another" without recognizing the corresponding costs of exclusivity. Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without
Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 167 (1991). These expressions of categorical
praise for group boycotts and coordinated social norms overlook the significant organizational and transaction costs that coordinated reputational sanctions introduce,
discussed infra at notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
17 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, United States v. Diamond Center,
Inc.,
C. 138-285 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1953).
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DDC members were refugees or family of victims from the Lowlands of Europe,'58 the DDC passed a more sweeping resolution:
The Board of Directors condemns the action of any member,
who manufactures either directly in Germany or who deals in
German goods. The names of said members, who are found
guilty of manufacturing or dealing in or with Germany or German goods will be posted on the bulletin board and displayed in
a conspicuous place in the Clubrooms. 5 9
On June 23, 1952, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
filed a complaint against the DDC for "engag[ing] in an unlawful
combination and conspiracy to restrict and prevent the importation
of diamonds from and the exportation of diamonds to Germany.""
The complaint alleged that the association and its members agreed
that "no member.., shall deal, directly or indirectly, with any
member of the German diamond industry or in its services or
products[and t]hat each defendant shall take steps to expel from its
membership or otherwise discipline any dealer violating the terms
of the agreement."' 6'
The DDC, along with co-defendant The Diamond Center, Inc.
(a smaller New York diamond bourse), initially asserted as an affirmative defense that the Club's
"8
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, United States v. Diamond Dealer Club, Inc.,
C. 138-285 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1953).
159Transcript of Plaintiff's Interrogatories Addressed to Defendant at 14, United
States v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., No. 76-343 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1 1954). This resolution followed a similar resolution at an international gathering of diamond dealers,
and it was implemented by a "German Activities Investigation Committee," which
was formed jointly with the Diamond Center and was assigned the responsibility of
carrying out the resolutions in cooperation with like-minded international associations. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, United States v. Diamond Center, Inc.,
C. 138-285 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1953).
"Complaint at 4, Diamond Dealers Club, No. 76-343 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1952).
Also listed as a defendant was the Diamond Center, Inc., which was described with
the DDC as a "trade association whose members are dealers in diamonds." Id. at 2.
The Complaint lists the members of both associations (1500 in the DDC, 900 in the
Diamond Center), as well as the umbrella organization World Federation of Diamond Bourses, as co-conspirators. Id. at 4. The Complaint also notes that
"[m]embership in either club is essential to the business of dealing in diamonds since
all trading is done in the meeting rooms of the two associations ....
[S]uspension or
expulsion from either association results in suspension or expulsion from all associations which are members of the World Federation." Id.
,61
Id. at 5.
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opposition ...to dealing in products of the German diamond in-

dustry is an expression of its members' horror and indignation on
broad moral grounds at intercourse with a nation and with individuals guilty of waging aggressive war and of genocide, and of
murder, rape, arson, robbery and similar crimes. Over ninetynine percent of [the DDC's] members... are Jews who them-

selves or whose friends, families and associates, were particular
victims of the criminal policies pursued by Germany and by
Germans.162

The defense was unconvincing to the Department of Justice, and in
1953, negotiations with antitrust policymakers in Washington and
New York persuaded the DDC to change its not-guilty plea to a
plea of nolo contendere. The DDC thereafter pledged to cooperate
with antitrust enforcers and adopted a provision in the DDC ByLaws that prohibited all restraints of trade.163
The court, in accepting the DDC's plea, also was unsympathetic
to what the DDC's attorney explained was conduct motivated
"purely on a moral and religious ground."'" The presiding judge
asserted that
in this country we try to forget the past and to forgive. You cannot permit a cancerous growth to commence and grow in this
country which will revive and revivify and continue the ancient
feuds and hatreds which these people have in their hearts quite
justly and which they brought with them from abroad when they
first came to our shores.'65

Current antitrust law, of course, would be unsympathetic for a very
different reason. Group boycotts are not sanitized because they

162Answer at $ 10, Diamond Dealers Club, No. 76-343 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1952).
The DDC also argued that the boycott of German goods and merchants had no material economic impact and that it constituted political expression protected under the
First Amendment. Id. $$ 19, 22.
163See supra note 44.
"6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, United States v. Diamond Dealer Club, Inc.,
C. 138-285 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1953).
165Id. at 10. The defendants assured the court that they would forgive, though did
not pledge to forget. Id. at 12.

2009]

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms

379

seek to advance noneconomic justifications, and the DDC's targeted boycott would be condemned as a naked restraint."
This poignant story of a historically disenfranchised immigrant
community asserting some political autonomy illustrates the temptation to abuse a procompetitive multilateral system of private ordering to pursue noneconomic objectives and cause anticompetitive harm. The temptation to hijack the power to exclude extends
into less compelling situations, and political ideology continues to
interfere with the DDC's policies and procedures.167 Furthermore,
however repentant the DDC was before the court in pleading nolo
contendere, the event is viewed retrospectively as a proud instance
of vindication.1
B. Rapaport v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)
Martin Rapaport is a successful and ambitious diamond dealer
who in 1978 started publishing the Rapaport Prices List, a weekly
newsletter that published the prices of diamonds of assorted carats
and cuts that were sold in the DDC during the preceding week.
The newsletter, which soon grew into the Rapaport Diamond Report and now covers all matters of interest to the diamond industry,
brought much-desired transparency to diamond market prices. Although subscriptions spread throughout the DDC and the entire
diamond industry, many dealers complained that prices quoted in

'66

FIC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S 411, 431-32 (1990) ("A rule

that requires courts to apply the antitrust laws 'prudently and with sensitivity' whenever an economic boycott has an 'expressive component' would create a gaping hole
in the fabric of those laws.").
167 See Rabinowtz v. Olewski, 473 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984) (ruling that
the DDC's arbitrators would be irreversibly biased against a party linked to connections with the Palestinian Liberation Organization).
'6' As one subsequent Chairman of the DDC put it many years later:
Despite that plea [of nolo contendere], the Diamond Dealers Club did not want
the terrible facts, which precipitated its actions, to go unrecited. At the sentencing, Nathan Math [the DDC attorney] eloquently defended the Club and the
action of its members, bringing forth all the pain suffered at the hands of the
Nazis. When he had finished, he had accomplished his purpose .... The two
clubs were fined $250 .... But the words of Nathan Math, and their impact on
those who heard him, gave the Club the victory it sought.
Albert J. Lubin, Diamond Dealers Club: A Fifty-Year History 15 (1982).
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the Report were frustratingly low. 6 9 Certain prominent DDC

members mounted opposition to Rapaport's growing influence
within New York's diamond circles, complaining both that the Report generated more benefit to Rapaport than to his subscribers,
and that Rapaport was bringing instability to a market and merchant community that craved order and self-control. Rapaport,
embracing his label as an industry "maverick," coolly responded
that the dealers were struggling to adapt to shrinking margins and
more competition.7 ' Tension between Rapaport and many of the
DDC's elders spilled into the broader Jewish community, with a
Jewish religious court ordering Rapaport to stop publishing his
pricelist (threatening excommunication) and Rapaport receiving
death threats, including one telephoned from a matzah factory in
Brooklyn."'
The first legal shot was fired on December 9, 1981, when "counselors for unnamed diamond dealers" petitioned the Federal Trade
Commission to investigate the business conduct of the Rapaport
Diamond Corporation.'72 The complaint alleged that Martin Rapaport, as both a diamond broker and a publisher of a weekly newsletter, was "artificially fixing prices in the diamond industry by disseminating an unsubstantiated price report."'' 3 The FTC staff
launched an initial phase investigation but found no evidence of

"'Rapaport v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., 1983 WL 14942, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 23, 1983). Ironically, a current complaint with the Rapaport Diamond Report is
that the quoted prices are too high. See Teresa Novellino, Rap Takes Heat Over Price
June
3,
2008,
List
Increases,
National
Jeweler
Network,
http://www.nationaljewelernetwork.com/njn/contentdisplay/diamonds/e3i5d0b266ef3
6902817016ea54d7f06bf3. These complaints over prices that purportedly reflect current demand and supply are explained, in part, by Rapaport's dual role as a publisher
of prices and as a dealer holding a private inventory. Charges of bias will likely continue to hound the RapaportReport as long as Rapaport stands to profit personally
from the manipulation of his published prices.
170See Sandra Salmans, A Diamond Maverick's War with the Club on 47th Street,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at Al ("[T]he directors of the Diamond Dealers Club...
complain that the Rapaport report is, in effect, setting prices. Mr. Rapaport says that
he is merely reflecting the marketplace.").
171Id.
" FTC Staff Request for DOJ Clearance, Matter #821-0041 (Bureau Of Competition Jan. 6, 1982).
173Id.
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any conspiracy to manipulate diamond prices, and it closed the investigation on June 7, 1982.'
The dispute reached a "boiling point" that same month when
Rapaport made highly critical comments in an industry magazine
article about diamond investment firms,175 many of which were run
by prominent DDC members. 76 Invoking a provision in the ByLaws authorizing the DDC Board of Directors to expel any member for making "any statement, act or conduct that in the Board's
sole judgment and discretion reflects adversely upon the integrity
of any member of the Organization,"'" the DDC Board voted to
expel Rapaport. Rapaport promptly sued the DDC in New York
state court, demanding readmission to the DDC and seeking $55
million in damages.78
These events once again invited the scrutiny of the FTC, but this
time the Commission's attention was directed at the DDC's exclusionary and predatory conduct against Rapaport. In February of
1984, the FTC Commissioners authorized an investigation into
74Memorandum

from Claude Trahan et al. to Leroy C. Richie, Matter #821-0041

(Bureau of Competition June 1, 1982). The complaint was filed as a Section 1 claim
under the Sherman Act and was referred to the FTC's horizontal restraints program.
The staff investigation noted, however, that "because there seemed to be a question
as to the accuracy of some of the prices reported," and thus a possibility that Rapaport was using false reporting in his newsletter to manipulate wholesale diamond
prices to benefit his own diamond sales, Rapaport's conduct would be better scrutinized under section 2, for possible attempts to monopolize the market. Id. The investigation nonetheless concluded that the wholesale market was very unlikely to be monopolized by Rapaport or by any other dealer. See id. ("Staff did not consider it in the
public interest to pursue this theory because the newsletter's gross sales amounted to
only about $300,000 and because additional price reporting services have recently
emerged."). The confusion of the complaint, and the sparse evidence to support accusation, suggests that the "unnamed diamond dealers" were launching a nuisance complaint.
75
1 Salmans, supra note 170.
76
Rapaport v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., 1983 WL 14942, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 23, 1983). Rapaport reportedly said, "diamonds, ethics, Feh! If the devil himself
showed up they would sell to him." Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 5, at 139 n.50.
" Rapaport, 1983 WL 14942, at *1 (quoting DDC By-Laws, supra note 16, at art.
VII, § 2). Although the language of the By-Laws appears to give arbitrary power to
the Board, the primacy of a merchant's reputation is a good justification for empowering the Board to punish those who impugn the character of a particular merchant.
The protection of individual reputations, and the judiciousness of revealing accurate
reputation information, is an important feature of the industry's reputation mechanism. See Richman, supra note 5, at 401-02.
1 See Salmans, supra note 170.
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whether the DDC or its members had "entered into agreements to
unreasonably restrain trade or commerce by obstructing the collection and dissemination of information concerning current diamond
prices."'79 Subpoenas were issued to DDC officers and other
prominent figures in New York's diamond industry, and despite
the DDC's repeated claims that its dispute with Rapaport was a
private matter, the Commissioners found sufficient evidence of
harm to competition to authorize a full-scale investigation.'"
The entire matter settled in early 1986. Rapaport was readmitted
to the DDC, his full standing in New York's diamond community
was secured, and the DDC Board and members took no additional
actions to disrupt the dissemination of the RapaportDiamond Report.8 ' Rapaport and his Report have since flourished in New
York's diamond community, and later in 1986, Rapaport was even
elected as a DDC director.'" Lisa Bernstein concludes from the incident that "[t]he norms of the diamond industry only work when
they capture information that the market values," and that the
DDC's failure to expel Rapaport is attributed to the value generated by his Report.'83 There are, however, less sanguine lessons to
draw. Like the DDC's attack on dealers of German goods in the
1950s, the Rapaport affair illustrates how personal animus and differing business philosophies can hijack the DDC's exclusionary
power to bar innocent parties inapproriately. More significantly,
the incident illustrates how the industry's established powers can
be hostile to nonconformists and innovative entrepreneurial mavericks. Harnessing group boycotts to target innovative entrepreneurs is not just a misuse of the industry's reputation mechanism, it
also undermines the very procompetitive justification for permit"' Secretary's Matters, Open Meeting of the Fed. Trade Comm'n, Matter #821-0041,
at 32 (Bureau of Competition Sept. 18, 1984).
,0Id. at 32, 38, 42. Perhaps an illustration of the bitterness of the dispute, lawyers
for the DDC moved to quash the subpoenas and petitioned to recuse Commissioner
Calvani, who authorized the subpoenas, from the proceedings. Both motions were
denied. Id. The DDC had been far more accommodating to the DOJ's investigation
three decades earlier.
.8,
Betty Ebron & Patrick Reilly, A Diamond by Any Other..., Crain's N.Y. Bus.,
June 23, 1986, at 4.
182 Roxanne Downer, Romancing the Stone, Trader Monthly (Apr.[May 2008), at
56, available at http://roxannedowner.wordpress.com/2008/04/15/romancing-thestone/.
183 See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 139 n.50.
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ting coordinated group boycotts. The DDC's resistance to technological or strategic change may be an expected outgrowth of the inefficient features of multilateral private ordering, but it should not
receive the same leniency as the industry's procompetitive group
boycotts designed to deter contractual breach. It is not surprising
that the DDC's dispute with Rapaport attracted the attention of
federal antitrust enforcers, and antitrust law should continue to
challenge similar misuses of the DDC's group boycotts."
C. Stettner v. Twersky (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006)
In May 2002, Brett Stettner, a retail jeweler from Galveston,
Texas, travelled to New York to purchase wholesale diamonds and
to obtain expert advice on cutting a 25.4 carat internally flawless
diamond worth between $1.5 and $2.5 million. For both of these
tasks, Stettner obtained assistance from Boruch Twersky, a DDC
diamond dealer and broker. Stettner put the 25.4 carat stone in the
possession of Twersky and also had Twersky facilitate a disputed
quantity of sales." 5
A dispute later arose between Stettner and Twersky when Stettner asked for the diamond's return. Twersky claimed that the diamond was collateral for some $200,000 worth of diamonds that
Stettner agreed to purchase from assorted dealers who used Twersky as a broker. Stettner countered that the diamond was never intended as collateral, that he had received less than $82,000 of diamonds on credit from Twersky and his associates, and that he had
only received an invoice for $200,000 after suing to recover the 25.4
carat stone.
When Stettner, who was not a DDC member, brought suit in
New York state court, Twersky claimed that the DDC had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute since Stettner signed a "Nonmembership Application and Agreement" that bound him to DDC

"4

Rapaport continues to pursue innovative business practices and continues to at-

tract criticism from industry interests. See Neil Reiff, Martin Rapaport: One Man's
Destruction of Our Industry, Jewelers Circular Keystone, July 1, 1998,
http://jck.polygon.net/archives/1998/O7/jcO78-105.html.
I Complaint at 2, Stettner v. Twersky, No. 6602298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2006);
Stettner v. Twersky, No. 602298/06, at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 11, 2006).
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M The issue before the court was whether this nonarbitration."
membership agreement extended to Twersky's help in cutting the
25.4 carat stone, which in part was dependent on whether the stone
were intended to serve as collateral for other credit purchases. Testifying on Twersky's behalf were Isaac Merin, the dealer for whom
Twersky brokered sales to Stettner, and Jacob Banda, another
diamond dealer and Chairman of the DDC. Stettner had separate
dealings with Banda, which had developed into a disagreement,
and Stettner alleged in his complaint that Twersky told him he
would only return the 25.4 carat diamond "when the separate 'dispute' with Banda had been resolved to Banda's (and his) satisfaction, and not before."'" Thus, Stettner found himself up against a
team of DDC members, all of whom were asking the New York
court to cede jurisdiction to the DDC's arbitrators. 8
The Stettner-Twersky dispute is a classic insider-outsider conflict, in which the outsider reasonably fears that he will receive unfair treatment from the industry arbitrators, especially when the
head of the DDC acts as an interested party. Recent opinion concerning the quality of DDC's arbitration confirms that outsiders
like Stettner increasingly expect biased results. An industry watchdog remarked, "[i]n recent years we have witnessed a serious erosion of [mutual] trust" in the industry's arbitration system, and increasingly, there are "bourse members who believe that an Israeli
arbitration panel will always decide against a New York party and
that a New York arbitration panel will always go against an Israeli
party in the dispute."' 89 There also is a growing problem with judgments rendered in absentia, where one party-usually a nonmember of the presiding bourse-claims not to have received fair notice

' Under the DDC's By-Laws, a non-member can only enter the DDC as an invited
guest of a member. DDC By-Laws, supra note 16, at art. XVII. Twersky sponsored
Stettner's visit to the DDC so Stettner could purchase diamonds. Stettner, No.

602298/06, at 2.
8, Complaint at 2-3, Stettner, No. 6602298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2006).
" The court retained jurisdiction over the dispute and ordered the diamond's return
to Stettner. Order at 2, Stettner, No. 6602298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2006). Twersky
did return the diamond, Answer at 3, Stettner, No. 6602298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28,
2006), and Stettner pursued no other claims, Order, Stettner, No. 6602298 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. Apr. 17, 2007).
' Arbitration Justice in Absentia, Diamond Intelligence Briefs, Apr. 14, 2008.
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before a default judgment is rendered against him.'" And DDC arbitrators have been further accused of being complicit in schemes
by fellow DDC members to swindle consumers with inflated and
fraudulent GIA certificates.' 9'
Stettner v. Twersky and the "in absentia" cases illustrate the flip
side of many of the benefits of relying on DDC arbitration to resolve disputes. Because arbitrators are insiders with industry expertise, they purportedly can issue judgments with greater accuracy,
flexibility, and speed than generalist judges or juries,'92 but the
same insider status also threatens the arbitrators' impartiality and
objectivity. Because of the failure of public courts to enforce diamond contracts, the authority of the arbitrators and the reputation
mechanisms they trigger are relied upon to secure order in the industry, but this reliance on private actors only magnifies the danger
of partiality.'93 To the degree that antitrust law is asked to scrutinize concerted actions against outsiders like Stettner, it should distinguish coordinated efforts to extract rents from outsiders from
the procompetitive boycotts that target individuals found to have
deviated from their contractual commitments.
The industry's arbitration system cannot survive, of course, without a minimum degree of credibility. If DDC arbitration rulings are
perceived to be tainted by bias, arbitrariness, and ideology, then
parties might turn instead to alternative instruments. Merchants
might construct complex contracts that rely less on credit and more
"oId.; see also Affidavit in Support of Motion to Show Cause 7, Sanghvi v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., No. 7601085 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2007) ("It was obvious
that the [DDC] was not attempting to reasonably consider the issues of jurisdiction or
whether I was even involved with the claim, but instead wanted to protect its members .... "). The problems concerning DDC arbitration are reaching a crisis point for
some. These and other recent developments have compelled one observer to conclude that "the quality of [DDC] arbitration (i.e., the kind of justice that is being rendered) has so deteriorated, that people are resigning their Diamond Dealers Club
membership, to avoid the chance that in a business dispute they may be forced to
agree to arbitration." Email from Chaim Even-Zohar to Barak Richman, Professor of
Law, Duke University School of Law (July 10, 2008) (on file with author).
19 Chaim Even-Zohar, Bourse Leadership, Arbitrations, and Fraudulent GIA Certificates, Diamond Intelligence Briefs, February 26, 2008, at 4676.
92 See supra Section I.B; Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 5, at 1741.
193 A recent proposal to eliminate term limits for DDC officers, which has been described as an effort to permit Banda "to become president-for-life," would cement
partiality and further insulate the DDC from market pressures that demand credible
rulings. Chaim Even-Zohar, supra note 191.
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on collateral that public courts, despite their costs and deficiencies,
might capably secure; the industry might see more vertical integration, despite the associated bureaucratic costs; or reputation circles
might become smaller, relying less on DDC membership to signal
credibility and resorting to more intimate personal exchange.
In fact, many of these developments have started taking placegreater use of state courts, more reliance on formal banks for
sources of credit, and more integrated distribution channels-in
large part because of the costs of relying on multilateral private ordering to support exchange. 94 These developments have led to the
recent observation that "[t]he diamond industry is in the middle of
a constructive upheaval."'95
CONCLUSION

Even as reputation mechanisms remain a fixture in the economy
and a topic of fascination among academics, they may run afoul of
the antitrust laws. This Article recognizes that beneficial reputation
mechanisms can be characterized as horizontal agreements to implement group boycotts, that these agreements could be literal violations of current antitrust law, and that antitrust law therefore requires reform. This is because antitrust law has yet to recognize
explicitly the institutional efficiencies of horizontal agreements that
arise in response to what is best described as a court failure. Transaction cost economics offers an affirmative justification for horizontal restraints that enable collective contract enforcement, and it
thus suggests that antitrust law should move away from per se or
heightened scrutiny and instead adopt a more tolerant approach to
certain concerted refusals to deal. Reputation mechanisms and
their corresponding group boycotts can contribute to procompetitive collaborations that promote efficiency, and they should therefore be permissible under antitrust laws that are dedicated to
maximizing consumer surplus. Institutional analysis also warns,
" See id. ("The DDC, once upon a time one of the most important and prestigious
bourses in the world, sees its membership declining."); Chaim Even-Zohar, Reflections on Diamond Industry Financing in a BASEL II Compliant Environment, DiaCompliance, Fall 2007, at 1 (detailing several modern financial instruments, rather
than credit based on reputations, that are increasingly used to finance diamond purchases).
' Chaim Even-Zohar, supra note 146, at 1.

2009]

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms

387

however, that multilateral private ordering is associated with its
own substantial costs. Concerted group boycotts can exclude innovators and benevolent outsiders and harness private governance
for private gain. An antitrust analysis should therefore evaluate
whether a particular group boycott is designed to achieve procompetitive multilateral private ordering or to secure anticompetitive
rents.
The most immediate implication for antitrust law is that it should
not apply the per se rule to concerted group boycotts. The per se
rule is applied only to practices that "'always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and output,' ' '.96 and the procompetitive use
of group boycotts in the diamond industry-a stark illustration of a
more general phenomenon-indicates that the per se label does
not fit. But a broader consultation of institutional economics might
yield many more lessons for antitrust law as well. Institutional economics should be useful, as illustrated here, in helping antitrust
policymakers distinguish anticompetitive group boycotts from procompetitive joint ventures to enforce contracts. More generally,
antitrust analysis of industry self-policing and trade associations
should include an appreciation for transaction costs, organizational
efficiencies, and the comparative strengths of alternative institutional arrangements. While a transaction cost economics analysis of
the Diamond Dealers Club, an idiosyncratic trade association
within an oddly structured industry, suggests a relatively minor reform to antitrust law, it also reveals the ways in which new methodologies can broadly inform antitrust analysis.

' Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (quoting Nw.
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985)).

